diff --git a/src/permission/reactor-authorize.ts b/src/permission/reactor-authorize.ts
index 3f44afdd8..496f64396 100644
--- a/src/permission/reactor-authorize.ts
+++ b/src/permission/reactor-authorize.ts
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import {
   type WorkerGrantStore,
 } from "./worker-grant.js";
 import { canonicalToolName } from "../agent/canonical-tool-name.js";
+import { prepareDispatchedToolCall } from "../agent/tool-aliases.js";
 import { getSubAgentIdentity } from "../subagent/identity-context.js";
 import {
   FLEET_VERBS,
@@ -100,6 +101,23 @@ function resolveWorkerCwd(cwd: string | undefined): string {
   return cwd ?? getSubAgentIdentity()?.cwd ?? process.cwd();
 }
 
+/**
+ * The call as DynamicToolRunner dispatches it: canonical engine name plus
+ * hidden-alias argument coercion (gpt `shell` -> run_shell via
+ * coerceShellArgs). Authorize sees the raw wire call; the middleware that
+ * consumes an authorized retry sees the dispatched call. Keying both on the
+ * dispatched shape keeps one fingerprint per executed call. Invalid hidden
+ * arguments never dispatch, so they keep their raw shape.
+ */
+function dispatchedCall(call: ToolCallType): ToolCallType {
+  const engine = canonicalToolName(call.name);
+  try {
+    return prepareDispatchedToolCall(call, engine);
+  } catch {
+    return { ...call, name: engine };
+  }
+}
+
 function workerCallIdentity(
   sessionId: string,
   call: ToolCallType,
@@ -110,10 +128,11 @@ function workerCallIdentity(
   args: Record<string, unknown>;
   cwd: string;
 } {
+  const dispatched = dispatchedCall(call);
   return {
     sessionId,
-    canonicalTool: canonicalToolName(call.name),
-    args: (call.arguments ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>,
+    canonicalTool: dispatched.name,
+    args: (dispatched.arguments ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>,
     cwd,
   };
 }
diff --git a/src/permission/worker-grant-dispatch-identity.test.ts b/src/permission/worker-grant-dispatch-identity.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a419ae7fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/permission/worker-grant-dispatch-identity.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+// gpt-family workers call run_shell as `shell`. Reactor authz sees that raw
+// wire call; the permission middleware sees DynamicToolRunner's
+// prepareDispatchedToolCall output, whose coerceShellArgs rebuilds the
+// arguments. The authorized retry must match the same envelope at both
+// stages.
+import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import type { ToolCall } from "@intx/types/runtime";
+
+import { prepareDispatchedToolCall } from "../agent/tool-aliases.js";
+import { gateToolCall } from "../plugins/permission-plugin.js";
+import { createPermissionGate } from "./gate.js";
+import { workerPermissionGate } from "./reactor-authorize.js";
+import { WorkerGrantStore } from "./worker-grant.js";
+
+const CWD = process.cwd();
+
+// The call shape a gpt-family worker sends for run_shell.
+const wireCall = (id: string): ToolCall => ({
+  id,
+  name: "shell",
+  arguments: {
+    command: "git status --short",
+    timeout: 120000,
+    cwd: CWD,
+    background: false,
+    stop: "",
+  },
+});
+
+function extractRequestId(reason: string): string {
+  const match = /grant request ([0-9a-f-]{36})/.exec(reason);
+  if (match?.[1] === undefined) throw new Error(`no grant id: ${reason}`);
+  return match[1];
+}
+
+describe("gpt-family worker authorized retry identity", () => {
+  test("approved retry of a `shell` call executes once instead of minting a new grant request", async () => {
+    // Parent: reactor-gated interactive gate, nothing pre-approved, no auto.
+    const parentGate = createPermissionGate({
+      approvals: [],
+      cwd: CWD,
+      skipPermissions: false,
+      interactive: true,
+      reactorGated: true,
+      auto: false,
+      requestApproval: async () => ({ allow: false }),
+    });
+    const store = new WorkerGrantStore();
+    const workerGate = workerPermissionGate(parentGate, {
+      sessionId: "worker-gpt",
+      store,
+    });
+
+    // 1. First attempt: reactor authz denies and records envelope A.
+    const denied = await workerGate.authorizeCall(wireCall("call-1"));
+    if (denied.effect !== "deny") throw new Error("expected worker deny");
+    const requestId = extractRequestId(denied.reason);
+    const envelope = store.peek(requestId);
+    expect(envelope?.canonicalTool).toBe("run_shell");
+
+    // 2. approve_worker_call: parent approved the frozen call (allow-once,
+    // no session grant) and flipped the envelope to authorized.
+    expect(store.authorizeRetry(requestId)).toBe(true);
+
+    // 3. Retry, stage 1: reactor authz on the raw wire call allows via
+    // hasAuthorizedRetry (does not consume).
+    const retryAuthz = await workerGate.authorizeCall(wireCall("call-2"));
+    expect(retryAuthz).toEqual({ effect: "allow" });
+    expect(store.peek(requestId)?.status).toBe("authorized");
+
+    // 4. Retry, stage 2: DynamicToolRunner coerces the `shell` call onto
+    // run_shell, then the posix middleware runs gateToolCall.
+    const dispatched = prepareDispatchedToolCall(
+      wireCall("call-2"),
+      "run_shell",
+    );
+    expect(dispatched.arguments).not.toEqual(wireCall("x").arguments);
+
+    let executed = 0;
+    const result = await gateToolCall(
+      workerGate,
+      dispatched,
+      new AbortController().signal,
+      async (call) => {
+        executed++;
+        return { callId: call.id, content: "ran" };
+      },
+    );
+
+    expect(result.isError).not.toBe(true);
+    expect(executed).toBe(1);
+    expect(store.peek(requestId)?.status).toBe("consumed");
+
+    // One grant, one execution: a replay of the same call fails closed at
+    // both stages, and no second envelope was minted.
+    const replay = await gateToolCall(
+      workerGate,
+      prepareDispatchedToolCall(wireCall("call-3"), "run_shell"),
+      new AbortController().signal,
+      async (call) => {
+        executed++;
+        return { callId: call.id, content: "ran" };
+      },
+    );
+    expect(replay.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(String(replay.content)).toContain("already consumed");
+    expect((await workerGate.authorizeCall(wireCall("call-4"))).effect).toBe(
+      "deny",
+    );
+    expect(executed).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  test("an altered retry (different command) still fails closed", async () => {
+    const parentGate = createPermissionGate({
+      approvals: [],
+      cwd: CWD,
+      skipPermissions: false,
+      interactive: true,
+      reactorGated: true,
+      auto: false,
+      requestApproval: async () => ({ allow: false }),
+    });
+    const store = new WorkerGrantStore();
+    const workerGate = workerPermissionGate(parentGate, {
+      sessionId: "worker-gpt-alt",
+      store,
+    });
+    const denied = await workerGate.authorizeCall(wireCall("call-1"));
+    if (denied.effect !== "deny") throw new Error("expected worker deny");
+    const requestId = extractRequestId(denied.reason);
+    expect(store.authorizeRetry(requestId)).toBe(true);
+
+    const altered: ToolCall = {
+      ...wireCall("call-2"),
+      arguments: { ...wireCall("x").arguments, command: "git push --force" },
+    };
+    expect((await workerGate.authorizeCall(altered)).effect).toBe("deny");
+    const result = await gateToolCall(
+      workerGate,
+      prepareDispatchedToolCall(altered, "run_shell"),
+      new AbortController().signal,
+      async (call) => ({ callId: call.id, content: "ran" }),
+    );
+    expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(store.peek(requestId)?.status).toBe("authorized");
+  });
+});