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fix: Avoid disclosing the content of password inputs - #841
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It is the responsibility of the UI toolkit to mask passwords: they know which masking character to use depending on the platform and they know the exact position and size of each character. This was not clearly stated in the documentation though and we must have safeguards in place to prevent passwords leaking.
We now detect unmasked passwords when a value is comprized of more than one character for a password input. We apply a similar heuristic on character positions and widths. Masking replaces the value by U+2022 and metrics of the first provided character are repeated to avoid providing a default value that might be way off. Finally, start of words are always discarded for passwords.