fix(config): do not follow repository-controlled symlinks when indexing

api/config.py

@@ -505,6 +505,11 @@ def iterate_files(
 
     results: list[str] = []
     for p in Path(root_dir).rglob("*"):
+        if p.is_symlink():
+            # A repository-controlled symlink can point outside the clone;
+            # following it would read/embed a host file the repository
+            # author does not own. Skip it rather than resolve+open it.
+            continue
         if not p.is_file():
             continue
         if extensions and p.suffix.lower() not in extensions:

tests/test_config.py

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import os
+
 import pytest
 
 from api.config import iterate_files
@@ -60,3 +62,26 @@ def test_iterate_files_excluded_dirs(exclude_test_config, tmp_path, excluded_dir
     make_repo(tmp_path)
     files = set(iterate_files(root_dir=str(tmp_path), excluded_dirs=excluded_dirs))
     assert files == {"README.md", "CHANGELOG.md"}
+
+
+def test_iterate_files_does_not_follow_symlink_out_of_repository(
+    exclude_test_config, tmp_path
+):
+    """A repository-controlled symlink pointing outside the clone must not
+    be listed for indexing. Regression for the symlink-escape bug: the
+    walker used to call is_file() (which follows the link) with no
+    is_symlink() guard, so the indexer would open and embed the external
+    target's content."""
+    make_repo(tmp_path)
+
+    outside_dir = tmp_path.parent / "outside_the_clone"
+    outside_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
+    outside_secret = outside_dir / "secret.py"
+    outside_secret.write_text("DB_PASSWORD = 'outside-secret'")
+
+    alias = tmp_path / "innocuous_link.py"
+    os.symlink(outside_secret, alias)
+
+    files = set(iterate_files(root_dir=str(tmp_path)))
+    assert "innocuous_link.py" not in files
+    assert files == {"README.md", "CHANGELOG.md", "folder/code.py"}