fix(kms-auth)!: make DstackApp allowAnyDevice cover every app epoch

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -76,13 +76,16 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
   range; `remove*AtEpochs(0, latest root epoch, value)` in `DstackKms` and
   `remove*AtEpochs(0, currentAppEpoch, value)` in `DstackApp` revoke a value
   everywhere. `DstackApp` reports its setters as the new ERC-165 interface
-  `IAppEpochManagement` (`0x853d2b79`). The `Manage.s.sol` scripts require
-  `ROOT_EPOCH` or `APP_EPOCH`, or a `FROM_*`/`TO_*` range.
+  `IAppEpochManagement` (`0xc65f31b6`). The `Manage.s.sol` scripts require
+  `ROOT_EPOCH` or `APP_EPOCH`, or a `FROM_*`/`TO_*` range. `DstackApp`'s
+  `allowAnyDevice` stays a single switch: `setAllowAnyDevice(bool)` covers every
+  app epoch, so dropping the device restriction cannot leave an older epoch
+  open to any host.
 - App contracts deployed before app epochs (v0.5.x, v0.6.0) keep working with
   the upgraded `DstackKms` and KMS, which authorize them for app epoch 0 only.
   `Manage.s.sol` detects them by interface ID and calls their epoch-less
-  setters. Upgrading one to the current `DstackApp` keeps its compose hashes,
-  devices and `allowAnyDevice` as app epoch 0.
+  setters. Upgrading one to the current `DstackApp` keeps its compose hashes and
+  devices as app epoch 0, and its `allowAnyDevice` for every app epoch.
 - DstackKms, DstackApp: ownership transfers take two steps for proxies upgraded
   from v0.5.9: `transferOwnership` nominates, and the new owner must call
   `acceptOwnership`.
@@ -118,7 +121,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
   `removeKmsDevice`. Use the `*AtEpoch` or `*AtEpochs` forms; before any
   rotation, `addOsImageHashAtEpoch(0, hash)` is the old call.
 - **Breaking:** DstackApp: the epoch-less `addComposeHash`, `removeComposeHash`,
-  `addDevice`, `removeDevice` and `setAllowAnyDevice`, and with them
+  `addDevice` and `removeDevice`, and with them
   `IAppAuthBasicManagement`: an upgraded app no longer reports interface ID
   `0x8fd37527`, and calls to those functions revert. Use the `*AtEpoch` or
   `*AtEpochs` forms (`IAppEpochManagement`); at app epoch 0,

docs/app-key-epochs.md

@@ -43,8 +43,11 @@ Authorization checks only the selected row, with O(1) add, removal and lookup:
 
 - `DstackKms`: OS images, KMS aggregated measurements and KMS device IDs are
   indexed by **root epoch**. OS image limits also apply to app key requests.
-- `DstackApp`: compose hashes, device IDs and `allowAnyDevice` are indexed by
-  **app epoch**. Each required material must be allowed in the selected row.
+- `DstackApp`: compose hashes and device IDs are indexed by **app epoch**. Each
+  required material must be allowed in the selected row. `allowAnyDevice` is a
+  single switch over every app epoch: which hosts may run the app is not a
+  property of a key generation, and a per-epoch switch could leave an older
+  epoch open to any host after the current one is restricted.
 
 There is no implicit access in either direction. Rotating keys starts an empty
 row; approving a new row neither copies old approvals nor grants historical keys.
@@ -61,7 +64,7 @@ range, so one transaction revokes a value from all rows, with
 `remove*AtEpochs(0, latest, …)` in `DstackKms` and
 `remove*AtEpochs(0, currentAppEpoch, …)` in `DstackApp`. `DstackKms` writes
 registered root epochs (before any is registered, only epoch zero); `DstackApp`
-writes app epochs up to the next one, as do `setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpoch(s)`.
+writes app epochs up to the next one.
 `DstackApp` reports these setters as the ERC-165 interface
 `IAppEpochManagement` and no longer reports `IAppAuthBasicManagement`
 (`0x8fd37527`), whose epoch-less setters it removed. The scripts in
@@ -85,7 +88,9 @@ it could not get keys for.
 The `*AtEpoch` getters read the selected row, including legacy epoch zero.
 `EpochPolicyChanged` events include the row and the resulting permission. Legacy
 bool getters and events describe **epoch zero only**; changing a nonzero row does
-not change its legacy bool or emit a misleading legacy material event.
+not change its legacy bool or emit a misleading legacy material event. The
+exception is `allowAnyDevice` and its `AllowAnyDeviceSet` event, which cover every
+app epoch.
 Root policy rows from epoch 1 belong to the epoch's registration, so a row can
 be written only once the epoch is registered (register, prepare the row, then
 activate). A popped epoch's rows do not carry over: the next registration of the
@@ -110,8 +115,9 @@ The original bool mappings and `allowAnyDevice` retain their storage locations a
 are used directly as row zero. New storage consumes storage-gap slots in each
 contract (four in `DstackKms`, three in `DstackApp`); no entries are copied and no reinitializer is required. Existing
 owners, pending owners, policy flags, root registries and app epoch counters are
-preserved. Even if the pre-upgrade counter is nonzero, old global approvals grant
-only row zero after upgrading: explicitly populate the intended nonzero rows.
+preserved. Even if the pre-upgrade counter is nonzero, old global material
+approvals grant only row zero after upgrading: explicitly populate the intended
+nonzero rows. `allowAnyDevice` keeps covering every app epoch.
 
 Upgrade the KMS policy before app policies, then approve the intended rows before
 restarting guests or activating a new root. `DstackApp` advertises the optional

docs/onchain-governance.md

@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ to the next epoch. Removing a value from rows `0` through the current epoch revo
 | `removeComposeHashAtEpoch(uint256,bytes32)` / `removeComposeHashAtEpochs(uint256,uint256,bytes32)` | Remove a compose hash from one app epoch or a range |
 | `addDeviceAtEpoch(uint256,bytes32)` / `addDeviceAtEpochs(uint256,uint256,bytes32)` | Whitelist a device ID |
 | `removeDeviceAtEpoch(uint256,bytes32)` / `removeDeviceAtEpochs(uint256,uint256,bytes32)` | Remove a device |
-| `setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpoch(uint256,bool)` / `setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpochs(uint256,uint256,bool)` | Allow any device to run this app |
+| `setAllowAnyDevice(bool)` | Allow any device to run this app, at every app epoch |
 | `currentAppEpoch()` | The app epoch new keys are derived for |
 | `isAppAllowed(AppBootInfo)` | Check if app can boot with given config (app epoch 0 only) |
 | `disableUpgrades()` | Permanently disable contract upgrades |
@@ -189,15 +189,15 @@ app epoch 0 and the epoch-less setters `addComposeHash(bytes32)`,
 which authorize them for app epoch 0. Tell the two kinds apart by ERC-165 interface ID:
 
 ```bash
-cast call <app-id> "supportsInterface(bytes4)(bool)" 0x853d2b79 --rpc-url $RPC_URL  # IAppEpochManagement: epoch setters
+cast call <app-id> "supportsInterface(bytes4)(bool)" 0xc65f31b6 --rpc-url $RPC_URL  # IAppEpochManagement: epoch setters
 cast call <app-id> "supportsInterface(bytes4)(bool)" 0x8fd37527 --rpc-url $RPC_URL  # IAppAuthBasicManagement: epoch-less setters
 ```
 
 The `Manage.s.sol` app scripts check this themselves: on an older app they call the
 epoch-less setter and accept only `APP_EPOCH=0` or no epoch; on a current app they
-require `APP_EPOCH`, or `FROM_APP_EPOCH` and `TO_APP_EPOCH`. Upgrading an older app to
-the current `DstackApp` keeps its compose hashes, devices and `allowAnyDevice` as app
-epoch 0.
+require `APP_EPOCH`, or `FROM_APP_EPOCH` and `TO_APP_EPOCH`. `SetAllowAnyDevice` takes
+no epoch on either kind. Upgrading an older app to the current `DstackApp` keeps its
+compose hashes and devices as app epoch 0, and its `allowAnyDevice` for every epoch.
 
 ### AppBootInfo Structure
 

dstack/kms/auth-eth/contracts/DstackApp.sol

@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ contract DstackApp is
     // State variable to track if upgrades are disabled
     bool private _upgradesDisabled;
 
-    /// @notice Whether any device may boot this app. Epoch 0 only; for other epochs use the *AtEpoch getters and
-    /// EpochPolicyChanged.
+    /// @notice Whether any device may boot this app, at every app epoch.
     bool public allowAnyDevice;
 
     /// @notice Allowed device IDs for this app. Epoch 0 only; for other epochs use the *AtEpoch getters and
@@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ contract DstackApp is
     // Epoch zero continues to use the original fields above after an upgrade.
     mapping(uint256 => mapping(bytes32 => bool)) private _composeHashesByEpoch;
     mapping(uint256 => mapping(bytes32 => bool)) private _deviceIdsByEpoch;
-    mapping(uint256 => bool) private _allowAnyDeviceByEpoch;
 
     event EpochPolicyChanged(bytes32 indexed policy, bytes32 indexed value, uint256 indexed epoch, bool enabled);
 
@@ -58,7 +56,7 @@ contract DstackApp is
     event DeviceAdded(bytes32 deviceId);
     event DeviceRemoved(bytes32 deviceId);
     event UpgradesDisabled();
-    /// @notice Epoch 0 only; for other epochs use the *AtEpoch getters and EpochPolicyChanged.
+    /// @notice Covers every app epoch; there is no EpochPolicyChanged counterpart.
     event AllowAnyDeviceSet(bool allowAny);
     event RequireTcbUpToDateSet(bool requireUpToDate);
     /// @notice Additive audit event for reconstructing authorization policy.
@@ -172,10 +170,6 @@ contract DstackApp is
         return epoch == 0 ? allowedDeviceIds[deviceId] : _deviceIdsByEpoch[epoch][deviceId];
     }
 
-    function allowAnyDeviceAtEpoch(uint256 epoch) public view returns (bool) {
-        return epoch == 0 ? allowAnyDevice : _allowAnyDeviceByEpoch[epoch];
-    }
-
     // A request may select any app epoch up to the current one and is decided
     // on that epoch's row, so revoking a value takes every row that allows it:
     // 0 through currentAppEpoch.
@@ -229,24 +223,12 @@ contract DstackApp is
         emit EpochPolicyChanged(keccak256("compose-hash"), composeHash, epoch, allowed);
     }
 
-    function setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpoch(uint256 epoch, bool allowed) public onlyOwner {
-        _setAllowAnyDevice(epoch, bytes32(0), allowed);
-    }
-
-    function setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpochs(uint256 fromEpoch, uint256 toEpoch, bool allowed) external onlyOwner {
-        _setAtEpochs(_setAllowAnyDevice, fromEpoch, toEpoch, bytes32(0), allowed);
-    }
-
-    function _setAllowAnyDevice(uint256 epoch, bytes32, bool allowed) private {
-        _requireWritableEpoch(epoch);
-        if (epoch == 0) {
-            allowAnyDevice = allowed;
-            emit AllowAnyDeviceSet(allowed);
-            _emitPolicy("allow-any-device", bytes32(0), allowed);
-        } else {
-            _allowAnyDeviceByEpoch[epoch] = allowed;
-        }
-        emit EpochPolicyChanged(keccak256("allow-any-device"), bytes32(0), epoch, allowed);
+    // Covers every app epoch: restricting devices is a decision about hosts, not
+    // key generations, and must not leave an older epoch open to any host.
+    function setAllowAnyDevice(bool allowed) external onlyOwner {
+        allowAnyDevice = allowed;
+        emit AllowAnyDeviceSet(allowed);
+        _emitPolicy("allow-any-device", bytes32(0), allowed);
     }
 
     // Set whether TCB status must be UpToDate to boot this app
@@ -338,7 +320,7 @@ contract DstackApp is
         }
 
         // Check if device is allowed (when device restriction is enabled)
-        if (!allowAnyDeviceAtEpoch(appEpoch) && !allowedDeviceIdsAtEpoch(appEpoch, bootInfo.deviceId)) {
+        if (!allowAnyDevice && !allowedDeviceIdsAtEpoch(appEpoch, bootInfo.deviceId)) {
             return (false, "Device not allowed");
         }
 
@@ -362,5 +344,5 @@ contract DstackApp is
     }
 
     // Add storage gap for upgradeable contracts
-    uint256[45] private __gap;
+    uint256[46] private __gap;
 }

dstack/kms/auth-eth/contracts/IAppEpochManagement.sol

@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
 
 pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
 
-/// Epoch-scoped allowlist management. Each setter names the app epoch rows it
+/// Allowlist management. Each allowlist setter names the app epoch rows it
 /// writes: one epoch, or `fromEpoch` through `toEpoch`, at most the next epoch.
+/// `setAllowAnyDevice` covers every app epoch.
 /// Replaces the epoch-less IAppAuthBasicManagement (0x8fd37527), which policies
 /// predating app epochs still report; tools tell the two apart by interface ID.
 interface IAppEpochManagement {
@@ -19,6 +20,5 @@ interface IAppEpochManagement {
     function addDeviceAtEpochs(uint256 fromEpoch, uint256 toEpoch, bytes32 deviceId) external;
     function removeDeviceAtEpoch(uint256 epoch, bytes32 deviceId) external;
     function removeDeviceAtEpochs(uint256 fromEpoch, uint256 toEpoch, bytes32 deviceId) external;
-    function setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpoch(uint256 epoch, bool allowed) external;
-    function setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpochs(uint256 fromEpoch, uint256 toEpoch, bool allowed) external;
+    function setAllowAnyDevice(bool allowed) external;
 }

dstack/kms/auth-eth/docs/formal-verification.md

@@ -142,18 +142,19 @@ and admits one app per epoch, then one symbolic owner write where noted):
       (one epoch, or a symbolic range), including epoch 0's legacy fields.
 - [x] `check_AuthorizeApp_MatchesPolicy` — for both app operations,
       `authorizeApp` allows exactly when the epoch is active, the TCB
-      requirement holds, and that epoch admits the compose hash and device.
+      requirement holds, that epoch admits the compose hash, and the device
+      is allowed by `allowAnyDevice` or that epoch's device row.
 - [x] `check_PolicyWrite_TakesEffect` — each `*AtEpoch` setter on an epoch
       up to the next one, and each `*AtEpochs` setter on every row of a range
       ending at most there, either sets the value it was given or reverts on
       a zero ID.
 - [x] `check_FullRangeRemoval_RevokesAtEveryAppEpoch` — after removing a
-      compose hash, or a device and the any-device flag, from rows 0 through
-      the next epoch, no app epoch authorizes it, for either app operation.
+      compose hash from rows 0 through the next epoch, or a device from those
+      rows and clearing `allowAnyDevice`, no app epoch authorizes it, for
+      either app operation.
 
 Mutation-tested: requiring both the any-device flag and a listed device,
-ignoring the value of a per-epoch `allowAnyDevice` write, dropping a setter's
-epoch bound or widening it past the next epoch, aliasing epoch 1 onto the
+dropping a setter's epoch bound or widening it past the next epoch, aliasing epoch 1 onto the
 legacy fields, letting `isAppAllowed` decide at a nonzero epoch or read the
 prepared next row, a permissionless
 `advanceAppEpoch` and dropping its stale-transaction guard each produce a

dstack/kms/auth-eth/docs/specification.md

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Plus inherited storage in ERC-7201 namespaces: `OwnableUpgradeable`,
 | Slot | Name | Type | Writable by |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | 0 | `allowedComposeHashes` | `mapping(bytes32 => bool)` | `addComposeHashAtEpoch(s)`, `removeComposeHashAtEpoch(s)` at epoch 0 (owner); 5/6-arg initializer |
-| 1 | `_upgradesDisabled` + `allowAnyDevice` (packed) | `bool` + `bool` | `disableUpgrades` (owner, monotonic); `setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpoch(s)` at epoch 0 (owner); initializer |
+| 1 | `_upgradesDisabled` + `allowAnyDevice` (packed) | `bool` + `bool` | `disableUpgrades` (owner, monotonic); `setAllowAnyDevice` (owner, every app epoch); initializer |
 | 2 | `allowedDeviceIds` | `mapping(bytes32 => bool)` | `addDeviceAtEpoch(s)`, `removeDeviceAtEpoch(s)` at epoch 0 (owner); initializer |
 | 3 | `requireTcbUpToDate` | `bool` | `setRequireTcbUpToDate` (owner); 6-arg initializer only |
 | 4 | `__gap[49]` | `uint256[49]` | (none) |
@@ -238,8 +238,8 @@ byte sequence — no case variations, no trailing nulls, no whitespace.
 ### 3.11 Owner-only App mutations
 
 For each of the `*AtEpoch` and `*AtEpochs` forms of `addComposeHash`,
-`removeComposeHash`, `addDevice`, `removeDevice` and `setAllowAnyDevice`, and
-`setRequireTcbUpToDate`, `disableUpgrades`:
+`removeComposeHash`, `addDevice` and `removeDevice`, and for `setAllowAnyDevice`,
+`setRequireTcbUpToDate` and `disableUpgrades`:
 
 - **pre**: `msg.sender == owner()`.
 - **frame**: every storage cell except the one mapped to the operation.

dstack/kms/auth-eth/script/Manage.s.sol

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ interface ILegacyAppManagement {
     function removeComposeHash(bytes32 composeHash) external;
     function addDevice(bytes32 deviceId) external;
     function removeDevice(bytes32 deviceId) external;
-    function setAllowAnyDevice(bool allowed) external;
 }
 
 // Base contract with common functionality
@@ -238,16 +237,15 @@ contract AddDevice is BaseScript {
 contract SetAllowAnyDevice is BaseScript {
     function run() external {
         bool allow = vm.envBool("ALLOW_ANY_DEVICE");
+        require(address(app) != address(0), "APP_CONTRACT_ADDR not set");
+        require(
+            !vm.envExists("APP_EPOCH") && !vm.envExists("FROM_APP_EPOCH") && !vm.envExists("TO_APP_EPOCH"),
+            "allowAnyDevice covers every app epoch: unset APP_EPOCH, FROM_APP_EPOCH and TO_APP_EPOCH"
+        );
 
-        ILegacyAppManagement legacy = legacyApp();
-        if (address(legacy) != address(0)) {
-            vm.broadcast(vm.envUint("PRIVATE_KEY"));
-            legacy.setAllowAnyDevice(allow);
-        } else {
-            (uint256 from, uint256 to) = appEpochs();
-            vm.broadcast(vm.envUint("PRIVATE_KEY"));
-            app.setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpochs(from, to, allow);
-        }
+        // Apps with and without app epochs share this setter.
+        vm.broadcast(vm.envUint("PRIVATE_KEY"));
+        app.setAllowAnyDevice(allow);
 
         console.log("Set allowAnyDevice to:", allow);
     }

dstack/kms/auth-eth/script/README.md

@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ forge script script/Manage.s.sol:AddDevice --broadcast --rpc-url $RPC_URL
 
 #### Set Allow Any Device
 ```bash
-KMS_CONTRACT_ADDR=0x... APP_CONTRACT_ADDR=0x... APP_EPOCH=0 ALLOW_ANY_DEVICE=true \
+KMS_CONTRACT_ADDR=0x... APP_CONTRACT_ADDR=0x... ALLOW_ANY_DEVICE=true \
 forge script script/Manage.s.sol:SetAllowAnyDevice --broadcast --rpc-url $RPC_URL
 ```
 

dstack/kms/auth-eth/test/DstackApp.symbolic.t.sol

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ contract DstackAppSymbolicTest is Test {
         } else if (which == 3) {
             data = abi.encodeWithSelector(DstackApp.removeDeviceAtEpoch.selector, uint256(0), word);
         } else if (which == 4) {
-            data = abi.encodeWithSelector(DstackApp.setAllowAnyDeviceAtEpoch.selector, uint256(0), flag);
+            data = abi.encodeWithSelector(DstackApp.setAllowAnyDevice.selector, flag);
         } else if (which == 5) {
             data = abi.encodeWithSelector(DstackApp.setRequireTcbUpToDate.selector, flag);
         } else if (which == 6) {