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Support shared non-injectable secret references and authorized control-plane reads #5563

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Description

@stevenlee-oai

Credential providers may share confidential configuration such as an OAuth client secret. Storing the value separately in every provider makes rotation require updating every provider and risks stale copies. OCC also needs to retrieve that secret by reference to perform the initial OAuth authorization-code exchange, before the user's OAuth credential provider exists.

Example OCE flow

  1. An administrator registers a confidential OAuth application before any user connects an account. OCE wants OpenShell to store its client secret and return an opaque reference.
  2. A user completes OAuth consent. OCC retrieves the client secret from OpenShell using its authorized control-plane identity, then exchanges the returned authorization code at the OAuth server. OCC continues to own this initial exchange.
  3. The resulting user access/refresh tokens are registered as an OpenShell OAuth credential provider. Other users can connect using the same OAuth application, creating their own providers that reference the same client-registration secret.
  4. When the administrator rotates the shared client secret, dependent providers use its current value for subsequent exchanges and refreshes, without OCE rewriting every provider.

Public OAuth clients do not need a client secret; this is for confidential clients. OAuth authorization-code exchange and client authentication are described in RFC 6749 §4.1.3 and §2.3.

Requested capabilities

  • A workspace-scoped primitive to create, read, update and delete arbitrary non-injectable secrets by opaque reference. Reads must be restricted to authorized control-plane callers such as OCC and remain separate from runtime credential export.
  • Credential providers can reference a shared secret in their configuration and use its current value when minting or refreshing, so one rotation applies to all dependent providers.
  • Referenced secrets remain separate from usable runtime output: sandbox injection and GetProviderCredentials must not expose OAuth client secrets or other minting material. Current provider credential export behavior.
  • Define authorization, cross-workspace restrictions and deletion behavior for referenced secrets. Sharing one installation-wide secret across workspaces is a separate, deferred scope question; workspace-local sharing is the request here.

Related: #896 discussed a client-secret reference in an earlier design.

Activity

  1. changed the title [-]Support shared non-injectable secret references for credential providers[/-] [+]Support shared non-injectable secret references and OAuth authorization-code exchange[/+] on Nov 17, 2026
  2. changed the title [-]Support shared non-injectable secret references and OAuth authorization-code exchange[/-] [+]Support shared non-injectable secret references and authorized control-plane reads[/+] on Nov 17, 2026
  3. added
    state:acceptedA maintainer decided OpenShell should pursue this issue
    and removed
    state:triage-neededOpened without agent diagnostics and needs triage
    on Nov 18, 2026
  4. mrunalp commented on Nov 18, 2026

    @mrunalp
    Collaborator

    Assigning RFC number 0024 to this issue. The RFC lives at rfc/0024-workspace-secrets/ in #5699, together with its implementation.

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