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Security: artyomsv/code-spire

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

Security

Decided model (ADR-009). Clean-room, OSS-standard, zero code copied from any private source. Trust boundaries, authn/authz, encryption, and secrets.

M3 workflow authority

Repository role bindings select credentials; an account's former workspace is not authority and V72 removes that unused column. Source actor allowlists remain independent of reviewer lists. Unknown label attribution selects no profile even when an accompanying actor hint is allowed. Every eligible label, the pinned admission policy and the current ceiling restrict continuation.

Dashboard gate answers use the verified operator subject. Tracker answers require authenticated delivery, this source's membership and an explicit command binding gate, generation and artifact. GitHub native PR approval additionally re-reads the named latest decisive review, linked current head, human identity and measured push permission without DENY. Unsupported native channels are visibly unavailable. These authorities converge on ResolveGate; they are not interchangeable IDs.

Takeover compares stable machine identities recorded at admission/dispatch, independently of renames or later credential rotation. Its durable exact-binding publication revocation commits before compute is stopped and survives process death without relying on M1 cancellation. A publication already in progress cannot be recalled. Resume requires a verified operator, expected revision and note and re-observes current evidence. Retired items cannot resume. Production VERIFY and LAND remain unavailable. M3 acceptance and the separate per-forge UNVERIFIED entries distinguish automated evidence from live deployment limits.

Actors & trust boundaries

Actor Boundary crossed How it's trusted
Bitbucket (webhooks) → spire-gateway HMAC signature verify + source IP allow-list. Machine — no OIDC.
Human operator → spire-ui / management API OIDC (auth-code + PKCE) + RBAC roles.
A Code Spire service → another service (REST) OAuth2 client-credentials (service account).
A Code Spire service → another (async) Kafka with SASL/SCRAM or mTLS.
Code Spire → Bitbucket / Jira / LLM Bot tokens / API keys from secrets, TLS out.

Authentication & authorization (humans)

  • quarkus-oidc, provider-pluggable via quarkus.oidc.auth-server-url. Keycloak is the recommended/documented IdP but not required — any compliant OIDC provider works.
  • Flow: application-type=hybrid — a cookie session for the browser and its four WebSockets, bearer/JWKS for curl, CI and the runbook. This supersedes the pure bearer design this document originally specified; a browser cannot set an Authorization header on a WebSocket handshake, and a credential must not travel in a query string. See ADR-022 for the full reasoning and what it costs.
  • Each service is its own OIDC client, with its own cookie name and cookie-path, and owns one URL prefix: orchestrator /api (sockets at /api/ws/*), gateway /gw, worker /wk. Cookies are scoped by host+path, not by backend, so the prefixes are what stop one service receiving another's session credential. The realm needs an audience mapper per client.
  • A session is therefore per prefix, and each one has to be established. Every service exposes GET <prefix>/auth/login (@RolesAllowed, both roles, 303 back to /); the dashboard probes the siblings once it knows it is signed in and navigates to any that refuse, which completes silently against the existing provider session. This is not optional plumbing: neither fetch nor a WebSocket handshake can follow the cross-origin redirect that a missing session produces, so without it the gateway-backed screens reported "failed to fetch", a review's Context card failed alone on an otherwise working page, and the attention panel reported a healthy gateway as unreachable. All dashboard calls go through one wrapper that carries the script marker and sends a refusal to the login of the service that refused — sending it to the dashboard's own login re-mints a cookie that was never missing.
  • A session is RENEWED from its refresh token, not re-authenticated (2026-09-10). All four services set token.refresh-expired: true, token.refresh-token-time-skew: 60S and authentication.session-age-extension: 8H. This is a deliberate loosening and it is stated here rather than left implicit: a signed-in operator is not challenged again for up to eight hours, bounded by the realm's SSO Session Max. The realm's SSO Session Idle still ends an idle session, and a logout still ends every session including the provider's, so this extends an active session, not an abandoned one. Quarkus ships the option off and says an admin-level decision may be required; this is that decision. What it buys is not convenience. With it off the session died at the ID token's exp — five minutes on a default Keycloak — Quarkus auto-closed all four WebSockets, and the dashboard answered by assigning window.location to a login that completed silently and returned to the same screen. The operator saw a page reload itself every five minutes for no stated reason and lose whatever they had typed. An interface that discards work on a timer teaches operators to distrust it, and a security control nobody trusts is one they route around. Measured, reproduced and analysed in docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-10-session-renewal-and-unsaved-work-design.md; enforced by OidcSessionsAreRenewedTest (spire-arch), which fails the build if any service drops any of the three — refresh-expired is inert without session-age-extension, so a half-applied revert reads exactly like an applied one. Not yet observed working on a live stack — see docs/UNVERIFIED.md §B.
  • RBAC: two roles — spire-viewer (read reviews) and spire-admin (everything else: manage config, replay, rules). Enforced with @RolesAllowed. Roles map from the IdP, read from the access token (Keycloak puts realm_access there; reading the ID token yields an operator with no roles at all).
  • Three rules decide the matrix, and all three are needed. Can it spend money or change behaviour makes register, re-run and DLQ replay admin. What does the payload contain makes GET /api/dlq admin despite changing nothing — a dead-letter row carries the raw wire record, quoting source or carrying a brokered credential. Is it configuration makes every registry admin-only including its reads: SCM providers, LLM providers and models, context providers, prompt overrides, webhook registrations and the global settings.
  • The third rule replaced an earlier decision that the registries were viewer-readable because no secret is ever in the payload. That was true, and it was the wrong test: a registry listing is an inventory of every repository, inference endpoint, context source and model the deployment reaches, which describes its reach whether or not a credential is quoted. "No secret in the body" answers a narrower question than "should this reader know this".
  • A viewer therefore sees the reviews list and any review's detail, timeline, threads and assembled context, plus the attention panel — and no configuration screen at all. The dashboard hides what it cannot use, but the refusal is the API's: hiding is a courtesy, @RolesAllowed is the control.
  • The dashboard grants nothing by default. Every privileged control is gated on a role the session is known to hold, so the shell opens with nothing administrative offered and adds it once /api/me answers — never the reverse. hasRole(null, …) is false, and guarded routes have a third state ("unknown") that renders neither the page nor a refusal. An earlier version defaulted to permitted on the reasoning that the API is the real authority; sound about security, wrong about interface — it showed every operator the full admin surface for as long as the session took to load. An option disappearing reads as a malfunction, one appearing reads as loading. Only authEnabled: false (dev, where there are no roles to hold) grants without a role.
  • Public by design: /webhooks/* (an SCM presents an HMAC signature, not a token), /q/health*, and /api/me (a browser must be able to ask whether it needs to log in before it has).
  • The policy is deny-by-default; the inverse fails open, and what sits unnamed on the gateway is the registry of every repository's webhook secret.

Residual risks, stated plainly

  • TLS is the operator's edge, by design. Code Spire terminates no TLS and will not: termination is the most environment-specific part of a deployment, and every operator already has a way to do it — an ingress controller, a standalone proxy, a cloud load balancer. What the application guarantees is that it is correct behind any of them, which is a contract of five requirements written out in docs/TLS.md. Until one is in front, session cookies travel in plaintext on a LAN and are sniffable and replayable. This stops casual and unauthorised access; it does not stop an on-path attacker. TLS is a deployment requirement, not an optional hardening step. Note that a plaintext deployment beyond a loopback origin does not merely leak — no operator can sign in to it, because %prod forces Secure on the session cookie and a browser discards that cookie on any origin it does not consider trustworthy. Webhook ingestion and bearer-token API access still work, so the deployment can be running reviews nobody can log in to see. docs/TLS.md records the symptom, which is silent in every component.
  • The bundled identity provider is a localhost artifact. deploy/compose.yml publishes Keycloak in plaintext on its own port, pins KC_HOSTNAME to a Docker-internal address, and the shipped realm registers only http://localhost:* callbacks. It carries operator passwords, so any deployment beyond localhost must put it behind TLS and re-register its origins, or use an existing IdP. docs/TLS.md requirement 5.
  • Same-origin residual. Path scoping stops a compromised service receiving another's cookie. It does not stop one that achieves script execution in the shared browser origin from using it — HttpOnly prevents reading a cookie, not using it.
  • CSRF applies where it would not with bearer tokens. The session cookie is SameSite=Lax and no GET mutates (verified across all 21 resources).
  • A dev-mode stack discloses its route names. Running under quarkusDev, an unmatched path is answered with Quarkus's development "resources overview" — every endpoint, listed — to any authenticated caller, so a viewer can read the API inventory even though every configuration read is refused. Never anonymous (/api/* is authenticated), route names only, and absent from a production build (…runtime.devmode.ResourceNotFoundHandler). Tracked in techdebt/global/; the consequence is that the local auth test bed is a workstation tool, not a shared environment. The one path that reached it by accident — an OIDC callback the framework declined, because the state cookie had expired while a login page sat open — now answers 303 to / in every profile.

Service-to-service

  • Most inter-service traffic is async over Kafka → securing the bus (SASL/SCRAM or mTLS) covers the bulk. Topic-level ACLs per service principal.
  • There is no synchronous service-to-service HTTP. Every outbound HTTP client in the services calls an external host (an SCM, an LLM, a context source); the only inbound callers are the browser and SCM webhooks. An earlier version of this document specified OAuth2 client-credentials for spire-ui → spire-orchestrator calls — but spire-ui is a browser application, not a service, so those are operator requests carrying an operator session, not machine-to-machine ones.

Inbound webhook hardening (spire-gateway)

  1. Verify the SCM signature with the per-hook secret — reject on mismatch. Scheme is per-provider (SCM-MAPPING §7): Bitbucket X-Hub-Signature (HMAC-SHA256), GitHub X-Hub-Signature-256 (HMAC-SHA256), GitLab X-Gitlab-Token (constant-time static-token compare, not HMAC).
  2. Source IP allow-list (SCM published egress ranges). Note: Bitbucket Cloud signed webhooks are a recent, opt-in feature, so on Bitbucket the allow-list is doing real work, not just defense-in-depth.
  3. Drop bot-authored events — ignore any webhook whose actor is the bot's own identity, or the bot answers its own follow-up comments forever (ADR-013).
  4. Validate payload shape, then emit one event and return 202 — never process inline.

Encryption at rest (Google Tink)

  • Tink AES-GCM envelope encryption: a KEK (from KMS/keystore) wraps per-record DEKs; ciphertext carries a key id so rotation is non-breaking.
  • Field-level through EncryptionService at registry reads/writes for sensitive credentials. Machine-account tokens, including Jira/Confluence, now live in scm_provider.auth_secret under AAD provider:<account-id> (V59, ADR-041). Sources reference accounts and retain no credential after reconciliation. Legacy context-provider:<source-id> ciphertext is decrypted and re-encrypted after Tink initialization, atomically per row; failed rows retain their ciphertext for retry and diagnostics log only row ids. Legacy auth columns remain for one release. Compatible account/source kinds and equal origins are enforced before a credential is shared; disabled accounts resolve no context credentials. Account deletion is refused while sources refer to it. Scope reports are advisory metadata and confer no authorization. LLM/harness credential registries and deployment bootstrap secrets keep their existing boundaries.
  • Event payloads are encrypted in the event log — events don't carry diffs (ADR-011: metadata only, diffs re-fetched), but findings and context items may quote source code, which must not sit in the DB in cleartext. Randomized (AES-GCM) by default; where an encrypted value must be looked up, add a separate blind index (HMAC) rather than weakening to deterministic encryption.
  • Keys never live in the image or git; sourced from KMS / a mounted keystore / Vault.
  • KEK blast radius (ADR-015): the KEK is held by spire-orchestrator (event log + provider registry), spire-ui (encrypted finding fields), and — in active mode — spire-review-worker, which decrypts the per-command SCM credential the orchestrator brokers to it. spire-gateway never holds the KEK (only the webhook secret — the self-loop guard's bot account id lives in the registry, read by the orchestrator, so the gateway holds no SCM identity). A compromised worker therefore exposes the master key; this was an explicit operator trade-off (one keyset, no cross-schema DB read) over a dedicated worker-only key. The narrowing path — a separate envelope key for worker credentials — is recorded in ADR-015. Keep the holder list this short as services are added.
  • Scope honesty — the message bus (ADR-014): the "never rests in cleartext" guarantee applies to application-managed stores (Postgres, MinIO). Source-quoting payloads on cs.results DO rest on the broker's disk for the retention window without app-layer Tink (findings stay inline + plaintext per ADR-011/-014). Note (ADR-015): the SCM credential on cs.commands IS app-encrypted with the KEK — the worker holds it in active mode — so credentials never rest in cleartext on the bus, even though findings do. Mitigation for the latter is infrastructural: short retention on cs.results
    • broker disk/volume encryption (a documented deployment requirement) + SASL/mTLS transport. Escalation path if ever needed: findings behind an encrypted blob ref instead of inline.
  • Harness reviews put the assembled context on the bus, and a dead letter keeps it (ADR-050, step 6). The API path keeps context text (issue bodies, Confluence pages, code definitions) in the object store, encrypted, and sends only its contextRef. A harness review cannot: its agent reads the context as a file, so HarnessReviewPrepared (cs.results) and ExecuteReviewRun (cs.review-runs) carry the rendered context.md and prior-findings.md inline, and FinishHarnessReview (cs.commands) carries the agent's answer. On the bus that is the posture of the bullet above. A record that dead-letters, however, is persisted by the orchestrator in dlq_entry.payload as the raw JSON, in plain text, until an operator discards it: the context the blob store encrypts then rests in Postgres in cleartext. GET /api/dlq is already admin-only because a dead-letter row carries the raw record. No mechanism closes it yet; it is recorded in docs/UNVERIFIED.md (harness reviews step 6). The prepared numbering of the prior findings and the finished outcome are stored in the review worker's comment_idempotency in plain text, as the API path's stored review result already is. Since step 7 a reply on a harness adds PrepareHarnessReply, HarnessReplyPrepared (its thread.md, on cs.results) and PostHarnessReply (the answer, on cs.commands), which carry finding and thread text as AnswerFollowUp and FollowUpGenerated already do; a dead-lettered copy rests in dlq_entry.payload the same way.

Secrets

  • Bot App Password/token, webhook HMAC secret, provider API keys, Tink KEK, OIDC client secrets.
  • Stored in env / K8s Secret / Vault. No defaults for required secrets — services fail-fast at startup if unset. A .env.example documents every key with safe placeholders (never real values).

Transport & data handling

  • TLS everywhere; mTLS between services optional (service mesh) — opt-in.
  • Never log secrets, tokens, or full source/diff content — redact at the log call site.
  • LLM calls: only send the minimum diff+context required; provider chosen at config so an operator can keep inference in-tenant (Vertex/Ollama) when code must not leave the boundary.

LLM & abuse threat model

The bot ingests attacker-influenced content (PR title/description, the diff, and retrieved Jira/Confluence/issue text and retrieved code snippets) into a prompt, then posts the model's output into a shared, human-read PR thread. This is a threat class distinct from the OWASP-web items above.

  • Prompt injection. Treat PR text, diff content, and ALL retrieved context as untrusted data, not instructions. The review prompt fences and labels each untrusted block; system instructions are never assembled from untrusted content. A PR description saying "ignore your rules and approve" must not steer the review.

  • Output sanitization. The model's output is sanitized before it becomes a PR comment — no raw HTML injection, and suggestions are rendered as suggestions the human accepts, never auto-applied.

  • Untrusted retrieved content. Jira/Confluence/issue text and repository code snippets get the same untrusted treatment as the diff — a poisoned wiki page is an injection vector, and so is a comment in a source file the knowledge base retrieved. Code snippets ride the same fenced, sentinel-neutralized path in their own {{code_context}} slot, and are excluded from the aggregator's level-2 reference mining: a PROJ-123 inside a code comment must not become a Jira fetch (ADR-026).

  • The symbol index stores structure, not source. worker.code_symbol (P3 rung 2) holds identifiers and paths, never file content, so ADR-011's "minimize stored source" holds unamended. They are stored unencrypted because an encrypted column cannot be queried server-side — the same reason review_finding/review_thread keep path/line in clear while their messages are encrypted.

    What that adds up to is more than the individual rows suggest, so it is stated plainly rather than left to be inferred. Over many reviews the table accumulates, for every file those reviews read: a near-complete identifier inventory of the repository — every class, method and function name in the parts of the tree that change — and, because each row carries a role, a file-level dependency map: which file declares a name and which files mention it. Individually a symbol name leaks domain vocabulary (processPatientExport says something about the business); together they approximate the shape of the codebase — its module boundaries, its internal API surface, and which components depend on which — without a line of its source. Two consequences worth planning for: the table is a cross-repository store keyed by scmType:workspace/slug, so it holds this for every repository the deployment has reviewed; and it is the one place where a repository's structure outlives the review that read it, since diffs are never persisted (ADR-011) and context blobs are deleted with their review.

    The exposure is the operator's own Postgres — the same trust boundary that already holds their findings and file paths — and the mitigations available to an operator are: SPIRE_SYMBOL_INDEX_ENABLED=false turns rung 2 off entirely (code context degrades to rung 1, which stores nothing), and spire.symbol-index.retention-days bounds how long a row survives without being re-observed.

  • operator_identity maps named people to measured activity, which is new here (P4). Every other table this deployment holds is about repositories, reviews and money; this one is about humans, and per-author analytics is performance data. Three controls follow from that. It is admin-only including its reads (ADR-022's "a listing is an inventory" rule, at its sharpest — the listing is the map). The per-author read is row-level authorized in code, because @RolesAllowed cannot express "a viewer may read their own row"; an unmapped operator is refused rather than defaulted. And the mapping is never inferred: matching an OIDC preferred_username against an SCM handle would, on a coincidental match, show one person another person's data with nothing in the UI looking wrong — a silent failure about a named individual. review_finding itself holds no new personal data; review_status.author_id predates P4 and stays as it was, and email is still never logged or persisted (NFR-9).

Cost / abuse controls

"One bot, every PR, no per-seat" is the headline feature and the cost risk: any workspace member who opens/updates a PR triggers a paid LLM call.

  • v1: per-review token budgeting only (spire-diff). No fleet-level cap. This is a documented, accepted v1 gap.
  • Spend is now measured, not just bounded per review (ADR-023). Every LLM call is priced per token type (INPUT/CACHED_INPUT/CACHE_WRITE/OUTPUT/REASONING) at the rate in force when the call happened, recorded as a charge line rather than a single fabricatable total. A model whose pricing the catalog cannot resolve — no rate entered, or an operator has not decided whether it is billed at all — is refused before it can spend: at provider save/update (LlmProviderRegistry) and again immediately before the review call (ResultSaga), because pricing itself happens after the money is spent and cannot refuse anything. A call that still cannot be priced (a lookup fault, an unmapped vendor field) is recorded UNKNOWN and raised to the attention panel — never silently $0.00, which would be indistinguishable from a deployment that is genuinely free to run.
  • Fleet-level spend caps shipped (ADR-025). Three gates refuse before the money is spent: diff size on DiffFetched (before the context fan-out runs), the spend/call cap before GenerateReview, and the same cap in ConversationSaga — the last of which was the only genuinely unbounded path, since the turn cap is per thread and an @-mention removes it. Every cap checks two axes, SUM(cost_millicents) and COUNT(DISTINCT call_ref) over a rolling window, because a money-denominated cap is inert on an UNMETERED (self-hosted) deployment by design — the operator has asserted zero cost, so there is nothing in dollars to cap, while every other abuse scenario still applies to self-hosted inference hardware (a hammered GPU costs real money even when the LLM call line reads zero). The ledger ADR-023 built is what makes the money axis honest at all: the old accounting read "free" for every call it could not price, so a cap over it would never have fired. Two properties an operator must know: every limit is optional and unset means unlimited, so a deployment that configures nothing has no ceiling and behaves exactly as before; and the cap is soft, since charges are recorded after a call completes, with overshoot bounded by in-flight reviews × per-review cost.
  • Deferred (FR-later): per-repo/workspace admission rate limit (Spec B — the only part of the caps work needing new storage), per-repo spend caps (blocked on llm_charge carrying no provider_type), and bot-authored-PR skip. Draft/WIP-PR skip and the giant-PR guard are no longer deferred — both shipped.

The software factory (ADR-039)

The reviewer reads code and writes comments. The factory RUNS code: an agent executes model output at full shell access inside a container, on the operator's own machine. That is a different threat model and it belongs here — five places in docs/factory/ and one javadoc already point at this section, and until now it did not exist.

The boundary is the container, and the unit is three of them

A run is an init clone, an agent, and a publisher sidecar. The split IS the control:

Container Holds Cannot reach
init the SCM credential the handoff; it exits before the agent starts
agent the model key, or a placeholder in a model-proxied unit (review runs by default) any git credential — it physically cannot push
publisher the SCM write credential the workspace; /handoff is mounted read-only

Work leaves the agent only as a git bundle on /handoff. The publisher gates it against the protected-path floor and pushes. RunUnitSpec refuses at construction any unit where the publisher can write something the agent can write, because that is the property everything else rests on.

Every container of every unit runs with cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, a pids limit, and memory and CPU bounds. SandboxControlsTest asserts each of them reaches all three containers — until it was written, nothing anywhere did.

The agent's egress goes through a per-run proxy (Docker arm)

The agent container holds the model credential and runs model output with a shell, so it is the one container whose network is closed. With spire.run.egress.mode at report (the default) or enforce, each unit gets its own --internal Docker network, created with the bridge option com.docker.network.bridge.gateway_mode_ipv4=isolated. --internal alone removes the route to other networks but still gives the bridge an address on the host, so an agent that ignored its proxy could reach any host service listening there or on 0.0.0.0. The isolated gateway mode removes that address too. It needs Docker Engine 28.0 or later. On an older engine the worker refuses to start a unit behind the proxy, naming the version, rather than run it without the barrier. A leftover network under a unit's name is reused only when it is internal and gateway-isolated. The agent joins that network and nothing else: no default bridge, so no route to the host, its published ports (a developer's Postgres and Redpanda) or any other container. Its one way out is a per-run tinyproxy container (deploy/egress, cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, read-only root filesystem, 64 MiB), which sits on the default bridge and on the internal network as spire-egress, accepts clients from the internal subnet only, and chains to the corporate proxy when one is configured. tinyproxy reaches its upstream over plain HTTP only. So an https:// corporate proxy is refused before the unit is created, naming SPIRE_RUN_HTTPS_PROXY, and is never downgraded to http: that would send the proxy credential in clear text. A percent-encoded credential is decoded first, as the corporate transport decodes it. One that tinyproxy's directive cannot carry (a : in the user name, an @, whitespace, a quote) is refused, and the refusal does not quote it. The agent's HTTP(S)_PROXY name it and its NO_PROXY is empty. It still gets the CA bundle, because the corporate proxy re-signs what it forwards.

  • report lets every host through and records it. The worker reads the proxy log once the agent has gone and puts (host, port, allowed) on the run result; the orchestrator stores it in run_egress. This is how a harness's real hosts are measured.
  • enforce refuses every host the harness does not declare (HarnessAdapter.egressHosts: code, never the repository or the ticket). A refusal is always on the result. It becomes the failure cause, BLOCKED_EGRESS naming the host, only when the run failed anyway. A run that finished or pushed keeps its outcome, with the refused host beside it.
  • off is the kill switch: the agent goes back on the default bridge.

init and the publisher stay on the default bridge. They run our own code with the forge credential, which the agent never sees, and they never join the agent's network. The proxy log is agent-chosen text, so it is parsed strictly, capped at 256 distinct attempts, and a host the secret scrub would change is dropped. Only hosts and ports are kept, never a URL's path or user information. The network and the proxy carry the run's label, and destroy, held teardown and the orphan watchdog remove them with the unit.

On review runs the agent holds a placeholder (harness reviews step 3)

The agent still runs model output with a shell, and the egress proxy keeps it from sending what it holds anywhere undeclared, but a declared model host is exactly where a stolen key works. So under spire.run.credential-proxy.mode REVIEWS (the default: review-lane units) or ALL, a unit's agent is handed placeholder credential values, and the real one goes to a per-run model proxy (spire-model-proxy) in its own container. The agent's network holds only the agent and the model proxy, and the model proxy reaches the egress proxy on a second internal network the agent is not on, so the agent has no way out but the model proxy. The model proxy drops every credential header the agent sends, injects the real one, forwards only the harness's declared model paths (a path with .., % escapes or reserved characters is refused before matching), refuses methods other than GET and POST, absolute-form targets and upgrades, and replaces a 401 or 403 body (OpenAI's 401 echoes part of the refused key). Every other answer is passed on failing closed: response headers are an allowlist and a listed header carrying the credential is dropped, Location never passes, the vendor is asked for an unencoded body and an encoded one is refused, and every body is streamed through a mask that replaces the secret and a seat's account id, however the chunks split them (review of PR #394, security/H-1). A fragment of the secret, or the secret in another encoding, is not caught. Requests are bounded in number, size and time, and so is the vendor's answer (RUN-TOPOLOGY.md §6B.1). For a seat it holds only the access token and the account id, never the id_token (with its email claims) or the refresh token. Its log line names the method, the route the guard matched (or <refused>) and the status only, never the agent's path. It connects to the vendor by hostname through the egress proxy; no step checks the address the name resolves to, and TLS hostname verification is what keeps the credential from a wrong address (techdebt/spire-model-proxy/3-3-the-vendor-connection-has-no-destination-address-policy.md). Its container is sandboxed like the egress proxy's, mounts nothing of the unit's, and carries the credential in its environment only, never a label. The egress proxy of a proxied unit always enforces the harness's hosts, even when the global mode is report.

What this does not remove: the agent can still spend the credential through the model proxy, on the declared paths, for as long as the run lasts; it just cannot carry it out. docker inspect of the model proxy prints the credential, as it printed the agent's before. A harness that declares no credential route (today every harness but Codex), and every factory build under REVIEWS, still hands the agent the real credential. None of it has a live proof yet (docs/UNVERIFIED.md, the step 3 entry).

Fork pull requests on a harness (harness reviews step 8)

A fork's author controls every byte of the code the agent reads and can run, so a fork or unknown-provenance pull request is reviewed only under these rules, each enforced in code:

  • The real credential is never in the agent. The run worker refuses the unit (fork_requires_credential_proxy) unless a model proxy holds the credential, for every harness, before a container starts. Proxy mode OFF, egress off and a harness with no route all refuse; none falls back to a direct credential.
  • Linked context only from trusted people (8b). The links a review loads context from are read from text the fork's author wrote, so an untrusted pull request gathers a link only when the text was written by a person with push access by the /fix rule (ALLOW/DENY override, then the forge's measured permission): a comment by such a person, or the title, branch and description when the pull request's author is one. UNKNOWN or a failed read does not count, the reviewer bot's own comments never count (a finding the model wrote could quote a link the fork planted), and nobody counts while the bot's identity is unknown. The event log records ContextLinksTrusted with the authors who counted, or ContextLinksSkipped with those who did not and why; no comment text is stored or sent. Residual: a person with push access who quotes a fork author's link in a comment vouches for it; and the permission read is current, so someone who loses push access later still counted for a review already gathered.
  • Init never runs the fork's code. Init is JGit in the publisher image, not a git binary: it makes a fresh clone with a config of its own, no submodules, and fetches a pull ref Code Spire chose against an allowlist. The agent diffs the head against the target branch's copy and reads the rules from it, never from the fork. The fork's branch name never reaches the unit.
  • The wire is separate. An old run worker refuses the command rather than running it as trusted.
  • Reviews stay read-only. No write credential reaches the publisher or the agent; /fix on a fork stays refused.

Residual risks. Init holds the reviewer account's clone token (it can post) while it fetches the fork's objects; the objects are checked, but a flaw in JGit's pack or checkout handling would run in that container. A filter driver set in the init image's own system or global gitconfig is not covered by the fresh repository config. The agent can still spend the credential through the model proxy, as for any review, and prompt injection in the fork's code can steer the review's findings; the output is only findings, but a steered review can approve or miss a defect. Live-proven on spire-test #106 on Claude Code and Codex, key and seat, a canary that asked for the environment included (docs/factory/HARNESS-REVIEWS-8-ACCEPTANCE.md); hostile init content, GitLab and lagging, force-pushed or deleted heads are proven against fakes only (docs/UNVERIFIED.md, the step 8 entry).

What is NOT mitigated, stated rather than implied

  • Docker socket access is root-equivalent on the host. The run worker drives the daemon directly, so a compromised worker is a compromised host. The Kubernetes arm removes this; the Docker arm cannot.
  • Egress is only partly restricted on the Docker arm. The agent is behind its proxy (above), but report is the default and lets every host through until enforce is switched on. Enforce is global, with no per-repository extra hosts yet, so it is meant first for review runs and not for factory builds that need package registries. A model-proxied unit enforces whatever the mode (above). The verify check containers and the operator's sign-in container are still on the default bridge. In report mode a plain-HTTP request may name any port, because tinyproxy restricts ports for CONNECT only. Tracked in techdebt/spire-runtime-docker/2-3-a-run-unit-has-no-network-so-it-is-neither-isolated-nor-reachable.md and docs/UNVERIFIED.md.
  • One SCM token serves the clone and the push. The design calls for a read-scoped clone token and a separate write token; the code packs one machine-account secret into both slots. The agent still cannot reach either — JGit persists no credential under /workspace and the remote is removed after clone — but the init container holds a token that can write. See docs/UNVERIFIED.md §E.
  • The corporate proxy credential is in the unit's other containers. With egress on, the agent no longer receives the corporate proxy URL: its proxy variables name the egress proxy, which holds the upstream itself. init, the publisher, the verify containers and the egress proxy still carry the URL, basic auth included, in their environment, where docker inspect prints it. With egress off the agent carries it too. Give the proxy a scoped service account. What IS guaranteed is that it never reaches anything stored: the transcript and every failure detail are scrubbed of it in all three forms it takes.
  • There is no disk bound on a run unit. Memory, CPU and pids are bounded; disk is not, so one run can fill the daemon's disk and take every other run with it.
  • Self-reported token usage is trusted. Nothing inside a run unit can tell an honest small usage report from a dishonest one; only reconciliation against the provider's billing API could. The call-count axis of the spend cap is the partial mitigation, which is why ADR-025 insists on both.

The push gate is a floor, not a policy engine

It refuses a run that touches CI configuration — the paths that would let an agent edit the pipeline reviewing it. Path handling refuses .., absolute paths, backslashes and control characters before any glob runs; matching is case-insensitive and Unicode-aware; both sides of a rename are judged; and the tip tree is compared against the base, so a history-rewriting bundle cannot slip a change in behind a rebase. It is deliberately a small closed list rather than a configurable policy: a policy engine an operator can widen is one an agent can argue them into widening.

Not reused (clean-room note)

The private monorepo's encryption-common and Keycloak realm configs informed this design but are not copied. If encryption proves broadly reusable it may later be extracted into its own public Apache-2.0 library depended on by both projects.

There aren't any published security advisories