docs: fix init epilog about what none mode can (not) detect (1.4-maint) - #10343
Merged
ThomasWaldmann merged 1 commit intoSep 9, 2026
Merged
Conversation
The "About modes without encryption" paragraph claimed that only modes other than "none" let borg detect accidental corruption or malicious tampering. That is only half true: "none" mode still verifies the CRC32 of every repository object and the SHA-256 chunk IDs (e.g. on extract or with "borg check --verify-data"), so accidental corruption is detected. What "none" mode cannot detect is malicious tampering, because none of these checks involve a secret key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## 1.4-maint #10343 +/- ##
=============================================
- Coverage 82.13% 82.13% -0.01%
=============================================
Files 38 38
Lines 11478 11478
Branches 1808 1808
=============================================
- Hits 9428 9427 -1
- Misses 1465 1466 +1
Partials 585 585 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Harness. |
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
The "About modes without encryption" paragraph of the
borg initepilog (also in the generatedborg-initman page) says that using any mode other thannone"allows Borg to detect accidental corruption or malicious tampering with the repo", which impliesnonemode detects neither.That is only half true.
nonemode (PlaintextKey) still:decrypt()(assert_id), i.e. on extract, mount,borg check --verify-data, etc.,So accidental corruption is detected. What
nonemode cannot detect is malicious tampering, because none of these checks involve a secret key: anyone with write access can modify data and recompute everything up the chain (or simply run borg against the repo). Theborg checkepilog already states this correctly ("Tamper-resistance is only guaranteed ... against attackers without access to the keys").Verified on a 1.4-maint build with
-e nonerepos:borg checkcheck --verify-dataextractborg recreate --excludewithout any key/passphraseThis PR only rewords that paragraph; the generated
docs/usage/init.rst.incand man page are left for the usual release-time regeneration.🤖 Generated with Claude Code