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fix(isolation, safety): keep CanvasTTY's private data out of agents' reach - #161

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@BIackFIame BIackFIame commented Oct 22, 2026 •

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This replaces #148 (reworked on top of current main after #158 and alongside #159; the old PR is closed with a link here).

Branch pr/security-hardening-v2 (head 4802c945, 13 commits), stacked on pr/orchestration-reliability-v2 (the PR that replaces #147), which is stacked on #159. No UI.

Merge order: #159, then the orchestration reliability PR (#160), then this PR, then the subagent worktrees PR (#162). Until they are merged, this PR also shows their 24 commits.

Already in v1.8.2-test.2, and what this PR adds

All 13 commits of #148 shipped in the prerelease v1.8.2-test.2 ("isolation/private-data hardening from PR #148"). That build was cut from 1.8.1 on a hotfix line, so none of it is on main. This PR brings the same 13 fixes to main and makes them fit #159:

Why

When you closed #135 you asked us to drop its UI and keep only the isolation and enforcement hardening for behaviour main already has, as PRs without UI. This PR has that hardening, plus four small fixes from the same audit of existing code (redaction, file-id checks, Hermes reads). Every fix closes a way an agent could read or change data that CanvasTTY keeps private: other accounts' sign-ins, the control token, provider-secrets.bin, gateway sockets and Git config.

What changes for users

Agent isolation (sandbox-exec on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux):

  • Plugin data: plugin data, for example an accounts plugin's CLI homes and tokens, is hidden. Only the CLI home the agent was launched with is reopened.
  • Gateway sockets: on Linux these were writable and were taken from any CANVASTTY_*_ADDRESS variable. Now only CanvasTTY's own sockets are bound, read-only.
  • Projects inside plugin data: such a project is opened only where CanvasTTY placed it, so a subagent can no longer be started in another account's home.
  • Projects at HOME: with the project at HOME, CanvasTTY's data folder stays read-only (settings.json, plugins).
  • Git files: the files that redirect Git config and worktrees (commondir, config.worktree, .git/worktrees) are write-protected. .git, .git/hooks and .git/info cannot be renamed away.
  • Claude Code's temp folder: Claude Code keeps Bash-tool output and external-editor files in ${CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR:-/tmp}/claude-<uid> and ignores TMPDIR. The layer never made that folder writable, so on main every shell call of an isolated Claude fails with "Operation not permitted". An isolated Claude now gets CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR set to the launch's own private temp folder, on both seatbelt and bubblewrap. The shared /tmp/claude-<uid> is deliberately not granted: all of the person's Claude sessions use it, so an agent could rewrite another session's task output.

Base protection (without isolation):

  • Broad projects: private data stays private even when the project is the home folder. The list already includes the per-card Claude Code draft folders (claude-draft, which macOS: editing keys for Claude Code cards (newline, select-all, copy/cut/paste) and UTF-8 locale #145 adds under userData), although nothing creates them yet.
  • Read-only file tools: Read, Grep, Glob, LS and their Qwen Code and OpenCode equivalents are checked as well.
  • Globs: ** and {a,b} globs are matched correctly.
  • Uncheckable calls: a call the checker cannot analyse is refused instead of allowed.
  • Plugin data: plugin-data is now on the private list. An accounts plugin keeps every account's sign-in there, so an agent outside the layer (Manual, or isolation off) could read other accounts' tokens. The card's own account home counts as its own config folder, like CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, for as long as the CLI is still started with it. This is the same accountHome the launch pipeline already validates for the layer and for fix: fifteen bug fixes in isolation, orchestration, UI, plugins, GitHub sign-in and tests #159's hooks. A project CanvasTTY placed inside plugin data keeps its own files.

Other fixes:

  • Redaction: overlapping secrets are masked whole, and credential labels survive masking.
  • File ids: they are compared as bigints, so 64-bit ids are exact. The usage-history reader refuses a file that was swapped during the read.
  • Hermes: rollback-journal databases are read with locks, not as immutable.

Commits

  1. f1591798 fix(isolation): hide plugin data from isolated agents
  2. 9a5adde7 fix(isolation): bind only CanvasTTY's own gateway sockets, read-only
  3. 2cbcccbd fix(isolation): open plugin data projects only where CanvasTTY placed them
  4. b50dc0a2 fix(isolation): keep CanvasTTY's data folder read-only inside a project that contains it
  5. 9a3594a8 fix(isolation): write-protect the git files that redirect config and worktrees
  6. d7d78877 fix(safety): keep CanvasTTY-private data private under broad projects
  7. eaf06f85 fix(safety): refuse read-only file tools on CanvasTTY-private data
  8. 8bb279e8 fix(safety): match ** and brace globs, refuse what cannot be checked
  9. 20313b40 fix(redaction): mask overlapping secrets whole and keep labels for credential rules
  10. 261beb66 fix(files): compare file ids as bigints and preserve the bytes that were read
  11. 3329e23d fix(usage): read rollback-journal Hermes databases with locks, not as immutable
  12. 387a24d4 fix(isolation): give isolated Claude Code its own temp folder
  13. 4802c945 fix(safety): keep plugin data private in base protection, except the card's own account home

The messages, authors and dates are the same as in #148. Commit 1's message adds a paragraph on the shared account-home rule.

Commits 1–3 belong together: commit 1 alone is not safe on Linux without commit 2. Commits 6–11 are independent of 1–5 and of each other. Commit 12 is independent. Commit 13 builds on 1 (account home) and 6 (private list).

Verification

Risks

  • Plugin files: a plugin that passes another file of its data in env or args loses access to it under isolation ({launchFiles} is the supported way).
  • Accounts plugins: an accounts plugin must point the CLI home at a real, non-symlinked folder inside its own data.
  • Account home of a Kimi launch: when a contribution sets both KIMI_SHARE_DIR and KIMI_CODE_HOME inside its data, the last one counts as the card's account home. The hooks go there only when it is the KIMI_CODE_HOME one. With fix: fifteen bug fixes in isolation, orchestration, UI, plugins, GitHub sign-in and tests #159 alone, only KIMI_CODE_HOME was ever considered.
  • Projects at HOME: with the project at HOME, an agent can no longer write into a project stored inside userData. On Linux, git worktree add inside the layer fails for repositories in the project.
  • Base protection: it is still best effort: paths built at run time are not seen, and isolation is the real boundary. It now refuses some very large calls instead of letting them through. With it on, every Read, Grep, Glob and LS costs one hook round trip.
  • Plugin data under base protection: an agent outside the layer can no longer read plugin data by path, except its own account home and a project placed there. For example, a Manual orchestrator reading a subagent's worktree under plugin data by path is refused; the change review goes through the plugin.
  • Hermes: a busy rollback-journal Hermes database can delay one usage poll by up to about 7 s.

Depends on

The orchestration reliability PR (#160) and, through it, #159. Both share TerminalManager's launch path with this PR, and the account-home record and field now come from #159.

If closing the Even G2 companion threw, quitting skipped terminalManager.shutdown(), so PTYs were not hung up and sessions were not saved. Shutdown now runs its steps in order through runShutdownSteps, which logs a failed step and continues.
…e off

A Codex or OpenCode subagent's final answer could belong to an earlier
turn: OpenCode reused its session id as the turn id and reported idle
before its asynchronous answer read finished, and recordAnswer accepted
any answer. OpenCode now names each turn, reports no idle before the
answer is read and drops a read a newer turn superseded; retry counts as
a turn start. A submitted input (not an approval answer, not an empty
Enter in an idle card) starts a new task, and only an answer of the turn
that answers it is kept. A signal of that turn which predates the input
still moves the status, so wait_for_agent ends instead of hanging, but
brings no answer. An answer reported as the agent exits still counts.
main's signal glue is now applyRuntimeSignal, shared with the tests.

With CanvasTTY status hooks off a launch gets no hooks, so no answer can
be captured. Whether a launch has them is decided when it is planned
(deferred plugin launches included). wait_for_agent and get_agent_result
then return answerUnavailable { reason: "status_hooks_off", message } so
the orchestrator reads the output instead.

Every write of person or agent input now goes through one method,
writeInput, which does this bookkeeping; input() and deliverInput call it,
and a later writer that holds input and replays it must call it too, so a
replayed Enter counts as a submitted prompt. It writes nothing into a
process the card no longer runs.
…UseFailure

Once a turn id was active, the gateway dropped every non-start event with
a new turn id. Each hook runs on its own connection and can time out, so
when a turn's start hook was lost the whole turn, including its Stop, was
ignored and the card kept the previous turn's status. The gateway now
tracks whether a turn is open. After an idle, an unseen turn id opens the
next turn; during an open turn, or for an id already seen, the event is
still dropped as out of order.

When a tool the person approved fails, the agent CLI runs
PostToolUseFailure instead of PostToolUse. CanvasTTY did not register it,
so the card stayed needs_approval until the next hook although the turn
went on. It now maps to working.
node-pty reports a process killed by a signal as exitCode 0 plus the
signal. The signal was dropped, so an agent killed with SIGKILL (OOM,
kill -9) was recorded as "done, exit 0": wait_for_agent returned done,
get_agent_result said done, and the saved session restored as exited.

Record such an exit the way a shell does, as 128+signal (SIGKILL -> 137),
mark the session failed, and put the signal name first in the failure
details. Every reader of the exit (wait_for_agent, get_agent_result, the
session store, the HOME failure summary) already derives its state from
the exit code, so they now agree. Exits CanvasTTY causes itself (closing a
card, quitting) are unaffected: those sessions are removed before
the kill, and the exit handler ignores them.
A subagent spawned without launch options ran on its CLI's own default
model and sign-in (for OpenCode the hosted OpenCode Zen model), even when
its orchestrator ran on a model the person picked through a plugin's
launch options. A plugin the spawn does not name now keeps the
orchestrator's own values for a subagent of the same CLI; repeating the
person's choice needs no delegable declaration, and then the normalized
values must equal the orchestrator's exactly (missing keys come from the
orchestrator, never from the plugin's defaults). A subagent of another
CLI must name a plugin whose contribution set the orchestrator's model,
and spawn_agent reports servedBy (CLI, requested model, inherited or
explicit options).

- Recognise every form a CLI takes for its model: --model and --model=,
  -m and -mX for OpenCode, Codex, Qwen, Kimi and Grok, and for Codex also
  --profile/-p and -c/--config setting model, model_provider or profile.
- Refuse a second model (an explicit model next to a plugin that sets it,
  or two plugins that both set it; OpenCode crashes at start on two
  --model values) only for a subagent's launch. A person's own launches
  and restores start as before.
- Inherit an empty choice (a plugin without fields) as chosen. Leave out
  an inherited plugin that was turned off since, unless it set the model
  (then refuse); refuse with a clear reason when its fields changed.
- Reset modelSetBy at the start of each launch.
- Describe inheritance, servedBy and the refusals in the orchestrator
  skill and docs.

The core stays plugin-agnostic: it reads the plugin from the launch
options and the contribution, never from a fixed plugin id.
OpenCode drops every key that arrives while its full-screen view starts
(a few seconds). CanvasTTY typed spawn_agent's first prompt, send_to_agent
and plugin sessions.send as soon as the PTY existed, so an OpenCode
subagent sat at an empty prompt until the orchestrator gave up.

deliverInput now waits, within the same bounded wait it already had for
the launch, until OpenCode can take input: the terminal control sequence
that shows its text cursor on the alternate screen once its prompt has
focus, or a lifecycle hook from its plugin, counted only 2 s after the
launch's first one (the plugin can report before the prompt takes keys).
Only DEC private mode sequences are read; human-readable screen text is
never parsed and no status changes. Other CLIs keep getting input when
the PTY exists.

- The wait is used on macOS and Linux. Windows' pseudo console may not
  pass those sequences, so there input is typed when the PTY exists, as
  before.
- spawn_agent (checks, launch and readiness together) and send_to_agent
  wait at most 45 s, so the orchestrator gets the reason and the session
  id, not an MCP client timeout. Nothing is typed then.
- A handoff waits up to 15 s for the CLI to take input instead of
  failing at once; a caller that does not wait is told the state.
- Sends to one card are delivered in the order they were made, a queued
  send never reaches a later launch, and a send cancelled while it waits
  behind another settles at once and types nothing.
wait_for_agent accepted up to 600 seconds, but the MCP clients of several
supported CLIs (OpenCode among them) end a tool call after about 60
seconds, so an orchestrator that asked for a long wait got a failed call
instead of a result.

A call now asks for at most 100 seconds (default 50). Unless the
orchestrator's CLI is known to let a tool call run longer, a call returns
after at most 50 seconds. A timeout carries the status and the masked
output as progress plus a message to call again, and the tool
description in both catalogs, the orchestrator skill and the docs say
that a timeout means the subagent is still running.
Base protection is documented to refuse use of CanvasTTY's private data,
but its hooks only saw shells and file writes: Claude Code's Read, Grep,
Glob or LS, and the Qwen Code and OpenCode equivalents, could read
provider-secrets.bin, the control token or another account's home
without a check.

While base protection is on at launch, the decision hook now also
matches those read-only tools (Claude Code and Qwen Code matchers,
OpenCode's guard through CANVASTTY_RUNTIME_DECISION_READS). With base
protection off, a decision plugin's fail-closed hook still covers only
shells and writes, so reads never wait on the gateway. They map to a
read action that is checked only against the private data, with the
same rules as a shell read: the agent's own account home stays its own,
a search walks its folder, and nothing outside the private data is
refused or asked about. Decision services are not asked about reads.

OpenCode's grep without a path is sent as a search of ".", and glob's
pattern is always sent. Qwen Code's read_many_files is refused when its
paths and include globs together exceed 32, instead of checking only
the first 32, and include globs are checked. A cut read-only call is
refused like a cut shell call. Codex has no read-only file tool in its
hooks; it reads through its shell, which is already checked.

The docs now say base protection is best effort: it does not see paths
built at run time or folder walks started above the app's data, so a
project at the home folder needs agent isolation to keep the data
private.
The private-data rule matched globs one component at a time, so `**`
stood for a single folder and `cat ~/Library/**/provider-secrets.bin`
was allowed; brace expansion was not seen at all, so
`cat <userData>/provider-secrets.{bin,}` was allowed too.

- `**` now matches zero or more folders. A glob that only passes by the
  app's folder on its way to other names (`~/**/*.ts`) is not counted.
- Unquoted braces in a shell word, and braces in a Glob tool pattern,
  are expanded (at most 64 words) before matching.
- On macOS and Windows a glob matches private names in any letter case.

Base protection also had limits that let the rest of a call through
unchecked. A call now is refused ("uncheckable") instead when:

- a path field is not a string, or is longer than 4096 characters after
  folding `./` and `a/..` padding;
- read_many_files names more than 32 paths and include globs, or an
  apply_patch touches more than 256 files or a too-long path;
- the private-path budget (now 1024 checks), the brace-expansion limit,
  the path candidates in one word or heredoc (256), or the nesting of
  shells and substitutions runs out;
- checking a shell, file-edit or read call fails with an error. Before,
  an exception in the analyzer let the call through; other tools still
  get no opinion.

An apply_patch whose command is longer than 4096 characters is read in
full; before, it was treated as touching no file.
bubblewrap bound the shared gateway socket folders writable into every
isolated agent, so an agent could replace a gateway socket and receive
other agents' requests. It also took a socket folder from dirname() of
every CANVASTTY_*_ADDRESS in the launch environment, which holds the
person's variables and plugin contributions: $HOME/foo.sock bound all of
HOME after the tmpfs masks, and an address inside plugin data reopened
every account home. The control grant folder was read from the same
environment.

Socket folders are now bound read-only (connect() needs no write access
to the folder) and come only from the sockets CanvasTTY's own gateways
prepared for the launch; the control grant only from the control
environment the host gave an orchestrator. A socket that must not be
read is masked with /dev/null, and a gateway socket folder that holds a
hidden path is refused. On macOS the seatbelt Unix-socket allow list is
built from the same gateway sockets.
… them

With a project that contains userData (the home folder), an orchestrator
could start a subagent in <userData>/plugin-data/<plugin>/homes. The
isolation layer reopened any project at least two folders deep in plugin
data, so that subagent could read and write every account's sign-in.

A subagent's folder may no longer be inside CanvasTTY's private data,
unless the project itself is a folder inside that same plugin's data (an
environment's worktree). The layer reopens a project inside plugin data
only when the host placed the launch there: a folder an environment
prepared inside its own plugin's data, or the folder the person chose for
the card the launch descends from. Anything else is refused with the
reason.

Also: a gateway socket folder that contains a writable folder is refused
instead of mounted over it; a trailing separator in a CLI home variable
names the same account home; the docs list which variables count as an
account home, in English, Russian and Chinese.
…ct that contains it

When an isolated agent's project contains CanvasTTY's userData folder (a
project at the home folder), the whole project was writable, so the app's
settings.json and the plugins folder were writable to the agent; only the
private parts were hidden.

The isolation paths now carry readOnlyFolders (userData when a writable
folder contains it) and fixedFolders (its parents inside that folder).
Seatbelt denies writes in userData after the project allow, re-allows the
writable folders inside it (a selected account home) and denies renaming
or replacing the parents. bubblewrap binds each parent onto itself (a mount
point cannot be renamed), mounts userData read-only over the project and
binds the writable folders inside it again. A project located inside
userData is unaffected.
…worktrees

Inside the isolation layer only a repository's hooks, info/attributes and
an existing .git/config were protected. .git/commondir (where git reads the
shared config and hooks from), .git/config.worktree and the linked
worktrees' records in .git/worktrees stayed writable, and the path-based
rules could be sidestepped by renaming .git, .git/hooks or .git/info away
and back.

Seatbelt now denies writes to commondir, config.worktree and worktrees/ in
any repository of the project, existing or not, and denies renaming or
removing .git, .git/hooks and .git/info. For an existing repository the
paths list config.worktree and worktrees/ (Linux mounts them read-only,
with neutral placeholders when missing) and an existing commondir; on
Linux the project's .git is bound onto itself so it cannot be renamed.
Objects, refs, the index, logs and HEAD stay writable.
Base protection treated anything inside the working folder (and the
agent's config folder) as the agent's own before it checked
CanvasTTY's private data. With the project at the home folder, or at
any folder that holds the app's userData, an agent's shell command or
file tool could read or overwrite provider-secrets.bin, the control
token, other account homes and the gateway records. A project in a
temporary folder likewise reopened the gateways' socket folders.

A folder is now the agent's own only below the private data: a
private path or socket folder inside the project or config folder
stays private. A folder inside a private path (the account home the
agent was launched with) is still its own, and its neighbours are not.
A recursive walk of a folder in the app's data that holds private
paths is refused wherever the project is.

The per-card Claude Code draft folders (<userData>/claude-draft) are
listed as private data too; nothing creates them yet.
… immutable

A database without -wal/-shm was always opened with immutable=1, which skips locking and hot-journal checks, so a rollback-journal database could be read while Hermes was writing it. Use the immutable read only when the header says WAL (bytes 18 and 19 are 2) and no side files exist; open other databases with mode=ro and retry SQLITE_BUSY a bounded number of times before skipping the poll.
…edential rules

Held values were masked leftmost-first and the scan jumped past each match, so a second held value overlapping the first showed its suffix. Masking held values before the generic rules could also erase a label such as password or Authorization that a rule needed, leaving the credential visible, and each call allocated text-sized typed arrays. Find held values, JSON values and credential shapes as source ranges on the original text and mask the union of overlapping ranges; search held values with indexOf/KMP streams and a ring buffer instead of text-sized arrays; count entropy characters without regex match arrays. The empty-registry path is unchanged.
…ere read

The Files reader and the usage history reader bind an opened descriptor to
its path by dev/ino. As numbers, 64-bit file ids (NTFS, some network file
systems) lose precision, so two different files could compare equal.
Compare bigint stats instead.

The history reader also compares the pre-open lstat with the descriptor, so
a file swapped between the symlink check and the open is refused rather
than read and then quarantined. When invalid records are dropped, the
original is preserved from the bytes read through the checked handle
(exclusive create, mode 0600) instead of a second copy by path.
wait_for_agent, get_agent_result and observe_agent returned the raw PTY
tail, which for a full-screen TUI such as OpenCode is cursor moves,
colours and spinner redraws, often starting mid-sequence. They now render
the masked scrollback window (the last 65,536 characters) through the
existing headless xterm at the session's size and return the visible
text, masked again and capped as before (observe_agent within its
maxChars). A cut window starts at its first escape or line break, so the
rest of a cut sequence ("18;9H") is never printed as text.

exitLines were the regex-stripped last 16 KiB, so a TUI that redraws only
the cells that changed read as its redraws joined together, and a line
drawn early and never redrawn (the model's status line) was lost. They
are now rendered by the same headless terminal from the same window,
masked before and after, and the three tools return the same exitLines.
An isolated agent could read every plugin's private data folder
(<userData>/plugin-data), including every CLI home and token an
accounts plugin keeps there, not only the account it runs on.

plugin-data is now private app data for the isolation layer. The one
folder reopened is the CLI home a chosen launch contributor started the
agent with: the provider's own home variable set to an exact absolute
folder strictly inside that contributor's host-assigned data folder.
The host derives it from the contribution; a plugin cannot name a grant.
AgentIsolation checks it again when the layer is built (real folders,
no symbolic links from plugin-data down) and refuses the launch
otherwise, giving the reason once. A project inside plugin data is
reopened as that one folder.

The Grok/Kimi status hooks already take their account home from the same
contributor record (dataDir) and the same accountHome field; that field
now comes from this one rule (contributedAccountHome), and the hooks still
use it only when it is the GROK_HOME / KIMI_CODE_HOME the CLI reads, so the
home is checked once. The path helpers are shared with accountHomes.ts.
Claude Code keeps its Bash tool output and external-editor files in
${CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR:-/tmp}/claude-<uid> and ignores TMPDIR. The isolation
layer does not make /tmp/claude-<uid> writable, so every shell call of an
isolated Claude failed with "Operation not permitted".

Set CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR to the launch's private temp folder for Claude on
both layers (seatbelt and bubblewrap). The shared /tmp/claude-<uid> is not
granted: all of the person's Claude sessions use it, and an isolated agent
could otherwise rewrite another session's task output.
…card's own account home

An accounts plugin keeps every account's sign-in in CanvasTTY's plugin data
folder. Base protection's private list had account-homes but not
plugin-data, so an agent outside the isolation layer (a person-launched
card, or one with isolation off) could read another account's tokens.

Add plugin-data to the private list. The account home the card's launch
plugin selected (the home the launch pipeline already validates for the
isolation layer) is recorded with the card and counts as one of its own
config folders, as CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR does, but only while the CLI is still
started with it. Other accounts' homes, other plugins' data and the
listing stay refused; a project CanvasTTY placed inside plugin data keeps
its own files. plugin-data is not added as a name marker, since such a
project names that folder in its own paths.
The Kimi provider runs Kimi Code CLI, which keeps its configuration and
OAuth sign-in in KIMI_CODE_HOME (default ~/.kimi-code); the older kimi-cli
uses KIMI_SHARE_DIR (default ~/.kimi). The isolation layer only knew
KIMI_HOME, which neither CLI reads. So:

- a Kimi launch whose home was moved with KIMI_CODE_HOME (an account home a
  launch plugin hands it, e.g. one sign-in of an account pool) did not get
  that folder as its own writable state, and
- other CLIs inside the layer could read ~/.kimi-code, where Kimi Code's
  refresh token lives.

Kimi's own folders are now KIMI_CODE_HOME (or ~/.kimi-code), KIMI_SHARE_DIR
(or ~/.kimi), KIMI_HOME when set, and the usual named folders; all three
variables move Kimi's home. Nothing else changes.
…atus hooks and tools

Grok Build reads hooks only from GROK_HOME/hooks and Kimi Code only from
KIMI_CODE_HOME/config.toml; Kimi also reads its MCP servers (mcp.json)
and permission rules there. CanvasTTY wrote its lifecycle hook overlays
and Kimi's browser/agents configuration into the default homes only, so
a card a launch contributor started in its own account home (an account
pool) ran without working/idle/needs_approval status and without the
canvastty_browser / canvastty_agents tools.

When a launch contributor sets GROK_HOME / KIMI_CODE_HOME to an account
home below its own data folder (<userData>/plugin-data/<pluginId>, from
the host's record), the launch pipeline reports it as the launch's
account home and the same overlays are written there instead, shared by
the cards in that home and removed when the last one ends. A variable
pointing anywhere else, including another plugin's data, leaves the
launch as before. Inside plugin data every folder from plugin-data down
and every file CanvasTTY writes must be real (no symbolic link), or the
launch is refused. The overlays keep the existing lock, journal, backup
and marker rules, so the person's own settings are restored byte for
byte. The checks live in accountHomes.ts and are shared by both
overlays.

Claude Code, Codex, Qwen Code and OpenCode take their hooks from the
launch's arguments or environment and already work in any home.
…ts orchestrator

An OpenCode subagent on a launch contributor's model keeps bash on "ask"
(a launch contributor's other model keeps bash asking, like accept-edits
elsewhere). When no decision service decides, OpenCode's own prompt waits
in the subagent's card for the person. That part already works: the card
turns needs_approval, Needs attention lists it, and wait_for_agent
returns at once with the prompt in output. Two things stood in the way:

- send_to_agent still typed into that card. Any prompt text ends with
  Enter, which answers OpenCode's prompt, so the orchestrator (on the same
  third-party model) could approve the command for the person. It is now
  refused while the subagent is needs_approval, with a reason that tells
  the orchestrator to ask the person and wait.
- wait_for_agent returned the same pending prompt again on every call,
  so an orchestrator could only poll or give up. It now returns a prompt
  once; a later wait on the same prompt (the card has not changed since)
  waits for the person's answer and then for the subagent's turn, so the
  orchestrator carries on in the same turn once the person has answered.
  A new prompt is reported at once again.

Unchanged: bash stays "ask" for a third-party model in every card; a
decision service's deny still fails the call before OpenCode asks and its
allow (from a plugin the person let allow) still answers OpenCode's
prompt once; no verdict is never turned into an allow; person cards and
OpenCode on its own model are untouched; no new UI.

The test runs CanvasTTY's real OpenCode plugin, runtime gateway, decision
hooks, TerminalManager and orchestration tools: allow answers the prompt,
deny fails the call, no verdict reaches Needs attention and the
orchestrator, send_to_agent writes nothing, and the person's answer
resumes the subagent and the orchestrator's wait.
…s a subagent's approval prompt

Asks are answered by the person, or by a decision service the person
allowed, never by the orchestrator. The canvastty_agents tools already
refuse send_to_agent while a subagent is needs_approval. The control
endpoint did not: on an Orchestrator session's own connection, choose
answered Codex's approval prompt ("1. Yes, proceed") and dismiss answered
it with Escape ("No, and tell Codex what to do differently").

On an orchestrator's connection, choose, dismiss and send are now refused
with NEEDS_PERSON (not retryable, nothing is written) while the worker
is needs_approval, the status each CLI's own approval signal sets. For
Codex's choose and dismiss the menu is also checked: Codex can draw its
approval prompt before its PermissionRequest hook's report arrives, and
choose acts on that exact screen. codexApprovalPrompt matches Codex's
command, edits, permissions, network and MCP approval prompts, not hooks
review, folder trust, model or update menus.

Unchanged: menus that are not approvals stay the orchestrator's; status,
screen and result still read; interrupt still stops its own turn (the
asked call does not run); the person's own app-wide connection, the
card's input and decision services are untouched.

Tests run the real TerminalManager, AgentControlService, gateway and
control CLI request path with an orchestrator's session grant: approval
prompts refused before and after the hook report, non-approval menus
chosen and dismissed, the person's connection still choosing, and
send_to_agent refused at every CLI's approval signal and delivered once
the person answered.
…e UI scale

Some UI chrome kept fixed pixel sizes, so Settings -> Appearance -> UI
scale (0.85-1.25) did not reach it:

- The terminal card's options menu (Don't restore this window, plugin
  card actions) had a 12px font and pixel paddings while the card header
  around it scaled.
- The canvas shortcut-hints panel looked the same at 0.85 and 1.25.
- In Settings -> Plugins the plugin description scaled with the settings
  panel, but the permission list, the contribution rows ("App on
  canvas"), the plugin title, author, version, buttons, module and
  native-hook lists kept fixed 9-17px sizes, so at 1.25 one card mixed
  large and small text.

The menu and the hints panel now take their font size from
calc(Npx * var(--ui-scale, 1)) and size their paddings, gaps, radii and
minimum widths in em; the hints icon is sized in em too. The plugin
settings font sizes use the same calc. At scale 1.0 every size is the
same as before. UI_CONTRACT names the menu and the hints panel among the
chrome that follows --ui-scale.

The title bar is left as is: its height is shared with the native
window chrome (macOS traffic-light position, the startup page) and with
every viewport-bound overlay through --titlebar-height.
…like the reference

The Russian canvas hints and Settings still showed English: the
wheel/pinch hint, the hard-coded "Shift + drag" key cap in the hints
panel and the shortcut reference, the canvas navigation override
description ("wheel, pinch и drag ... Drag колёсиком") and the
Settings > Canvas wheel capture strings and Off/On/Key labels.

- Translate them, reusing the existing on/off keys and adding
  shortcutShiftDrag and canvasWheelCaptureKey; the hints use one word for
  the drag gesture ("перетаскивание"). The group-selection label no
  longer repeats its key cap (ru/en). A test checks that these ru strings
  hold no Latin words besides key names.
- The wheel/pinch and navigation override rows in Settings > Keyboard
  shortcuts wrap instead of cutting their longer Russian labels off.
- The hints panel showed raw bindings ("Alt+ArrowUp") while the shortcut
  reference showed "Alt+↑". Both use one formatter now. It maps key by
  key, so on macOS "Meta+Comma" reads "Command+," instead of the
  reference's ",nd+Comma" (the Comma key was replaced inside "Command").

The canvas wheel and navigation settings' text (only Settings shows it)
moves from the startup string table to canvasNavigationText.ts, next to
Settings, so it loads with the Settings chunk; renderer-bundle-splitting
checks it stays out of the startup bundle.
When GitHub returned a token but the /user request hit the request timeout,
the timeout's AbortError was taken for a cancellation: the poll stopped
silently, the flow was cleared and the status stayed "pending", so Cancel
did nothing. Only this flow's own abort now counts as a cancellation; a
timed-out profile request ends the sign-in as failed.
…or body

A transient 429/5xx from the token endpoint with a JSON body such as
{"error":"temporarily_unavailable"} skipped the transient-status check and
ended the sign-in as an unknown provider error after one answer. These
statuses are now retried with backoff whatever the body says; slow_down
keeps its own handling.
browser_click on an engine without layout returns when element.click()
answers; the fake engine reports the navigation it started afterwards.
Until Page.frameNavigated arrives the tab still shows the old document
as ready, so h.ready() could return before the revision advanced and
the test failed under load. h.ready() now takes the revision to wait
past.
"terminal window descriptors persist atomically without scrollback or
environment" saves a descriptor whose cwd is process.cwd() and then
checks the whole file against /buffer|environment|capability|token/.
Run from a checkout whose path contains one of those words (for example
a worktree named after an environments feature), the cwd alone matched
and the test failed on every run. The check now leaves the descriptor's
own cwd value out; everything else in the file is checked as before.
…h files

Closing a card started the run cleanup and the removal of runs/<id> at the same time, and a launch still being prepared (plugin prepare, environment wrap) could write run files after the folder was gone. A throw from the environment wrap also skipped the planned and contributed cleanup.

Contributed launches are now tracked. Closing waits for pending launches, then the serialized exit/restart cleanups, then removes the run folders each pipeline created for this card object, and the card folder only when it is empty, so a card brought back under the same id keeps its new run. An unadopted launch releases its planned spawn and contribution in a finally block, and a launch whose card was closed or restarted in the same tick never asks its plugins. Run folders are removed with retries for files Windows still holds open.
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chatgpt-codex-connector Bot commented Oct 22, 2026 •

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📝 Code Review ⚠️ Failed 2026-10-22T14:50:54.312846Z
We couldn’t complete this review. Comment @codex review to try again.
92690d1 Manual request
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@BIackFIame
BIackFIame force-pushed the pr/security-hardening-v2 branch from 9d32d4f to 92690d1 Compare October 22, 2026 14:43
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Self-review while the bot review fails: fixed two bypasses in their commits. On macOS the project folder itself can no longer be renamed away and back to carry .git changes past the layer; a nested repository's parent is still covered only by the session-end git audit. Base protection now expands sequence braces ({n..n}, {a..c}, {01..10}) as well as comma braces, so a private file named through one is refused. The Russian and Chinese docs now list plugin data as private.

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Codex Review: Something went wrong. Try again later by commenting “@codex review”.

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ℹ️ About Codex in GitHub

Your team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you

  • Open a pull request for review
  • Mark a draft as ready
  • Comment "@codex review".

If Codex has suggestions, it will comment; otherwise it will react with 👍.

Codex can also answer questions or update the PR. Try commenting "@codex address that feedback".

… delegated cards

Agent cards inherited CanvasTTY's whole environment, so every agent, every
subagent and every plugin-started card, isolated or not, received provider
API keys, tokens and organization-level admin keys (OPENAI_ADMIN_KEY,
ANTHROPIC_ADMIN_KEY) exported where the app was started.

Now an agent card never inherits admin credentials (*_ADMIN_*KEY,
*_ADMIN_*TOKEN) or CanvasTTY's own (CANVASTTY_GITHUB_TOKEN and any
CANVASTTY_*TOKEN/KEY/SECRET/PASSWORD); the person's own top-level agent cards
otherwise keep their environment, so CLIs signed in by API key keep working.
Subagents and every card a plugin starts, a plain shell card included since
the plugin drives it, inherit only an allowlist (path, home, user, shell,
locale, terminal, temporary and XDG folders, Windows system folders, proxy
and certificate variables, the CLIs' home folders); what they need beyond
that comes explicitly through a launch contribution's secretEnv. The launch
builders (agent runtime hooks, browser and orchestration bridge, OpenCode
inline config) now read the card's filtered environment instead of the
app's, so they no longer hand the person's OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT to a
delegated agent. A plain shell card the person starts keeps everything but
CanvasTTY's own credentials. CANVASTTY_AGENT_PASS_ENV in the app's
environment lists variables to keep anyway.
…'s shapes

OpenCode's decision bridge sent write, edit and multiedit all as toolName
"edit" with {file_path, content}. A decision service could not tell a
whole-file write from a partial edit, and an edit's replaced text was
dropped, so it could not see what the edit removes.

The bridge now uses Claude Code's names and shapes, which hooks and
decision services already read:
- write: Write {file_path, content}
- edit: Edit {file_path, old_string, new_string, replace_all}
- multiedit: MultiEdit {file_path, edits: [{old_string, new_string,
  replace_all}]}
- bash and apply_patch are unchanged.

Base protection reads file_path for Write, Edit and MultiEdit as before.
A test goes through DecisionHooks: the service gets kind "edit", the
path and both texts, and a MultiEdit outside the project is still
denied. The docs (en/ru/zh-CN, plugin-api.d.ts) list the shapes
OpenCode's tools arrive in.
The HOME limit row showed the used share as a bare "9%" with a bar and a
reset countdown; "used" was only in the hover/screen-reader text. Codex's own
status line shows "% left", so 9 % used read as 9 % left. The row now says
"9% used · 91% left" (ru «9% использовано · осталось 91%»), and the
hover/screen-reader line "9% used · 91% left" («использовано 9% · осталось
91%»). Usage history's latest observation says the same instead of a bare
percent.

The normalizers were right: Codex app-server usedPercent and Claude
utilization are the used share; a test pins both with fixture payloads.
…a way to the setting

A plugin page whose service could not run because the person had not trusted
its native code (or had its module turned off) only got "Plugin service is not
running.". The host now refuses those requests with a fixed text; frames show
it localized (ru/en), and the host notice carries an Open settings button that
opens Settings -> Agents -> Extension native code (or Settings -> Plugins for a
module). A trusted service that crashed or failed keeps the generic text, now
followed by its last error.
…led outcomes

A started GitHub device sign-in could not be cancelled, retried poll
failures until the code expired, and ended silently when GitHub answered
access_denied or expired_token. A sign-in that could not start showed
the raw IPC error ("Error invoking remote method 'github-auth:start':
...") at the top of the Plugins page, in English in the Russian UI.

- GithubAuthService.cancelDeviceFlow() is public and exposed through the
  existing github-auth IPC (main-renderer only) and preload.
- status() reports deviceFlowState: idle, pending, denied, expired,
  failed or cancelled.
- access_denied, expired_token, unknown provider errors and non-transient
  HTTP errors stop polling with that outcome; OAuth error bodies on HTTP
  400 are read as well.
- Network errors, timeouts, HTTP 408/429/5xx and unreadable bodies back
  off and retry, but five failures in a row end the flow as failed.
- slow_down keeps adding five seconds to every later poll.
- The host clock ends the flow as expired even if GitHub keeps answering
  authorization_pending.
- Settings shows a Cancel button next to the pending code and a localized
  status line (en, ru) for the outcome, using existing classes: denied,
  expired and failed use the Settings error style, cancelled is a plain
  status line. A start or cancel failure shows a localized line ("not
  configured" for a build without an OAuth client); the details go to
  the log.

The new sign-in lines live in PluginSettingsSection (the lazily loaded
Settings chunk), not in the startup string table; renderer-bundle-splitting
checks they stay out of the startup bundle.
@BIackFIame
BIackFIame force-pushed the pr/security-hardening-v2 branch from b79de17 to 4802c94 Compare October 25, 2026 07:41
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