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Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 826: Uncontrolled data used in path expression - #562
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… in path expression Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
kimocoder
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September 1, 2026 00:40
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Potential fix for https://github.com/kimocoder/wifite2/security/code-scanning/826
Use a stricter allowlist-style approach for static assets: serve only files directly under
static/by filename, rejecting any request containing path separators or traversal-like forms. This preserves current behavior (the code already caches byfilename = os.path.basename(file_path)) while eliminating uncontrolled path composition.Best single fix in
wifite/attack/portal/server.py(_serve_static_file):path[8:]) and reject empty input.os.path.basename(...)(no subdirectories).full_pathfromstatic_dir + safe_name, canonicalize once, do one containment check, thenisfile.This removes the duplicate
full_pathrebuild and duplicate commonpath check, and ensures the sink only receives a validated filename.Suggested fixes powered by Copilot Autofix. Review carefully before merging.