HYPERFLEET-1531 - docs: document tenant enforcement - #369
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WalkthroughThe documentation defines tenant enforcement configuration, trusted gateway headers, tenant dimensions, validation rules, system-caller restrictions, cross-tenant API behavior, database visibility, deployment settings, Helm values, legacy rows, and troubleshooting for tenant-related Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This documentation-only update describes tenant enforcement behavior and configuration without establishing a current merge-blocking risk. Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 11✅ Passed checks (11 passed)
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/api-operator-guide.md`:
- Line 737: Update the tenant enforcement statement in the operator guide to
include resource spec patches or updates alongside reads, lists, and deletes,
while preserving that enforcement is disabled by default and separate from JWT
authentication.
- Line 759: Align the system-caller write contract in docs/api-operator-guide.md
lines 759-759 and docs/runbook.md lines 319-319: describe only non-status
resource mutations, such as spec create/update/delete, as forbidden while
preserving status/conditions writes.
In `@docs/api-resources.md`:
- Around line 13-23: Update the “Tenant scoping” overview to explicitly state
that PATCH/update operations use tenant-scoped lookup and return 404 Not Found
for cross-tenant resources, alongside the existing reads, lists, and deletes
behavior.
In `@docs/deployment.md`:
- Line 215: Update the Helm schema validation statement in the deployment
documentation to limit its guarantee to tenant values supplied inline through
Helm values. Note that values loaded via config.existingConfigMap are read from
the referenced ConfigMap and are not validated by values.schema.json.
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docs/api-operator-guide.mddocs/api-resources.mddocs/authentication.mddocs/config.mddocs/database.mddocs/deployment.mddocs/runbook.md
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/database.md`:
- Line 59: The tenancy documentation must define how legacy rows with empty
tenancy are re-stamped, including the supported migration or administrative
operation and its effect on tenant enforcement; if no such operation exists,
remove the claim that they remain inaccessible until re-stamped and state the
actual behavior.
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/database.md`:
- Line 59: Update the resource creation documentation to clarify that the
creator-dimension tenancy rule applies only to non-system identities, while
system-identity create requests are rejected with 403 Forbidden before tenancy
assignment; state that system identities may write only status and conditions
and cannot create resources.
- Line 69: Enforce the gateway trust boundary for the system bypass: allow the
system header only from Envoy/Authorino-authenticated, allowlisted Sentinel and
Adapter identities; strip client-supplied system headers, require authentication
for those clients, and prevent direct pod access. Preserve tenancy predicates
for all other tenant-enabled API traffic.
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docs/database.md
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Document the tenant enforcement feature across the operator-facing docs: - config.md: server.tenant.* field reference, env vars, CLI flags, and validation rules - deployment.md: Helm values for tenant enforcement plus schema-enforced invariants and existingConfigMap behavior - authentication.md: trust model (gateway-injected headers, not JWT claims) and request behavior (403/404) - api-operator-guide.md: operator overview, config example, and runtime behavior with troubleshooting entries - api-resources.md: API-visible tenant scoping and the read-only tenancy field - runbook.md: tenant enforcement troubleshooting procedures - database.md: tenancy column, containment-based scoping, fail-closed behavior, and uniqueness vs. visibility
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| - A non-system caller missing a required tenant dimension header (or presenting an invalid value) is rejected with `403 Forbidden` before the request reaches any resource. | ||
| - The `tenancy` field is server-populated on create from the caller's resolved dimensions; it is read-only and any `tenancy` supplied in a create or patch body is ignored. | ||
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| System callers (e.g. Sentinel, adapters) bypass scoping but may only write `status`/`conditions` — a resource create or update from a system identity is rejected with `403 Forbidden`. See [Tenant isolation](authentication.md#tenant-isolation) for details. |
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Tip
nit — non-blocking suggestion
Category: Inconsistency
Small inconsistency: this line only mentions "create or update" being rejected for system identities, but delete is rejected too (and every other place in this PR — api-operator-guide.md, authentication.md, runbook.md — lists all three). Worth aligning the wording here:
| System callers (e.g. Sentinel, adapters) bypass scoping but may only write `status`/`conditions` — a resource create or update from a system identity is rejected with `403 Forbidden`. See [Tenant isolation](authentication.md#tenant-isolation) for details. | |
| System callers (e.g. Sentinel, adapters) bypass scoping but may only write `status`/`conditions` — any other resource mutation (create, update, or delete) from a system identity is rejected with `403 Forbidden`. See [Tenant isolation](authentication.md#tenant-isolation) for details. |
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| ## Configuring Tenant Enforcement | ||
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| Tenant enforcement scopes resource reads, lists, updates, and deletes to the caller's tenant. It is **disabled by default** and is **only safe behind the Envoy + Authorino gateway**, which injects the trusted tenant headers the API relies on. See [Tenant isolation](authentication.md#tenant-isolation) for the trust model. |
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Not sure if this section is clear or correct, the tenant enforcement is essentially backed by NetworkPoliciy to ensure all traffic flows through the envoy and authorino.
There is no mention of network policy here or the implications
| | **400 Bad Request** | Resource spec doesn't match OpenAPI schema | Check the loaded schema path: `kubectl logs -n hyperfleet-system deployment/hyperfleet-api \| grep "schema_path"`. Retrieve and inspect the schema: `kubectl exec -n hyperfleet-system deployment/hyperfleet-api -- cat $HYPERFLEET_SERVER_OPENAPI_SCHEMA_PATH`. Validate and fix spec. | | ||
| | **401 Unauthorized** | Missing or invalid JWT token | Verify authentication is enabled (`server.jwt.enabled=true`). If production, ensure valid JWT token is provided. Reference: [Authentication Guide](authentication.md). | | ||
| | **404 Not Found** | Resource doesn't exist | Verify resource ID is correct. Check if resource was deleted: `curl http://<api-service>:8000/api/hyperfleet/v1/clusters/$CLUSTER_ID`. | | ||
| | **403 Forbidden** | Tenant enforcement rejected the caller: missing/empty required dimension header, invalid dimension value, zero resolved dimensions, or a system identity attempting a resource create/update | Confirm the gateway (Envoy + Authorino) is injecting the configured dimension headers and the system header. Check config: `kubectl get configmap <release>-config -o yaml \| grep -A6 tenant`. Verify each `required: true` dimension header is present and its value matches `^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$` (max 63 chars). System callers must set `server.tenant.system_header` to `true` and may only write status/conditions. See [Tenant isolation](authentication.md#tenant-isolation). | |
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Is this correct 🤔 server.tenant.system_header is the configured header name, not a boolean callers set to true, which i read as this is implying, but I could be wrong here 🤔
| - A resource that belongs to a different tenant returns `404 Not Found`, not `403`, on `GET`, `PATCH`/update, and `DELETE` — cross-tenant existence is never leaked. | ||
| - List endpoints return only resources within the caller's tenancy; `total` reflects the scoped result set. | ||
| - A non-system caller missing a required tenant dimension header (or presenting an invalid value) is rejected with `403 Forbidden` before the request reaches any resource. | ||
| - The `tenancy` field is server-populated on create from the caller's resolved dimensions; it is read-only and any `tenancy` supplied in a create or patch body is ignored. |
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Is this correct? Does the API ignore or reject with 400?
| - **All requests get 403** — the gateway (Envoy + Authorino) is not injecting the configured dimension headers, or a `required: true` dimension header is missing/empty. Verify the gateway `AuthConfig` injects the headers named in `server.tenant.dimensions[].header`. | ||
| - **Invalid dimension value** — dimension header values must match `^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$` and be ≤ 63 characters; other values are rejected with 403. | ||
| - **System caller can't write resources** — system identities (system header value `true`) may only write `status`/`conditions`; any other resource mutation (create, update, or delete) returns 403. This is expected — route resource writes through a tenant-scoped identity. | ||
| - **Resources "disappear" (404)** — the caller's resolved tenancy does not contain the resource's tenancy. Confirm the caller's dimension headers match the tenant the resource was created under. Cross-tenant reads return 404 by design. |
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The containment direction is reversed here I think. Authorization requires the caller’s tenancy to be a subset of the resource’s tenancy (resource.tenancy @> caller); an org caller therefore need not contain a project-level resource tenancy.
But please confirm this 🙏
| - `server.tenant` (validated only when `server.tenant.enabled=true`): | ||
| - `system_header`: required; must be a valid HTTP header name and must not be an authentication header (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Set-Cookie`, `X-Api-Key`, `X-Auth-Token`, `X-Forwarded-Authorization`, `Proxy-Authorization`) | ||
| - `dimensions`: at least one entry required, and at least one entry must have `required: true` | ||
| - `dimensions[].header` / `dimensions[].key`: both required; `header` must be a valid HTTP header name, must differ from `system_header`, and must be unique (case-insensitive) across dimensions; `key` must be unique across dimensions |
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Missing that dimension headers can use authentication-header names, so better to be clear on this as it should fail during API startup
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Summary
Documents the tenant enforcement feature across the operator-facing docs, per HYPERFLEET-1531.
Tenant identity arrives as trusted HTTP headers injected by the Envoy + Authorino gateway (ADR-0020) — never from JWT claims — and drives per-request scoping of resource reads, lists, and deletes. The feature is disabled by default.
Docs updated
server.tenant.*field reference, environment variables, CLI flags, and validation rulesexistingConfigMapbehaviortenancyfieldtenancycolumn, containment-based scoping, fail-closed behavior, and uniqueness vs. visibilityNotes
Documentation-only change. All claims were verified against the current source (
pkg/tenant,pkg/services/resource.go,pkg/config/server.go,charts/).