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PRISM_DEPTH_MAXIMUM assumes ~6 MB of C stack; Ruby threads (1 MB) overflow at ~2000 levels #4305
Description
Follow-up to #4252. With #4258 and fb2fea4 every nesting I tried now stops at "nesting too deep" on the main thread, including a pure C harness at 64000 levels. Thanks for the quick fix.
The limit only holds on a main-thread-sized stack though. Each level costs roughly 500–600 bytes of C stack (nested arrays are the worst case I measured; other constructs cost 150–450 bytes per depth unit), so reaching PRISM_DEPTH_MAXIMUM (10000) needs close to 6 MB. A Ruby thread gets 1 MB, and there the check never fires:
require "prism"
src = "x = " + "[" * 2000 + "]" * 2000
Prism.parse(src).errors # => []
Thread.new { Prism.parse(src) }.value # => SystemStackErrorMeasured on main (cde8d11, Ruby 3.4.9, arm64 macOS):
| context | stack | nested [ |
nested [ pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| main thread | 8 MB | "nesting too deep" at 10000 | "nesting too deep" at 10000 |
Thread.new |
1 MB | overflows between 1500 and 2000 | overflows between 2000 and 4000 |
C harness, ulimit -s 1024 |
1 MB | SIGSEGV between 1600 and 2000 | SIGSEGV between 2000 and 3000 |
Outside of CRuby that is a segfault rather than an exception, and Rust and the JVM default to 1–2 MB thread stacks as well; RUBY_THREAD_MACHINE_STACK_SIZE only helps whoever starts the CRuby process. I think the root is that #3413 matched the limit to Bison's YYMAXDEPTH, but Bison's stack is on the heap and Prism's is C frames (parse.y parses 9000 nested [ under ulimit -s 2048), so the same number does not give the same safety.
Options, in increasing order of effort:
- Lower the default to something that fits 1 MB. Simple, but reverts Increase value of PRISM_DEPTH_MAXIMUM to 10000 #3413 and rejects code that parses today; real view templates already went past 1000 in Support a maximum depth to protect against malicious payloads #1774.
- Keep the default and let the host set the limit through
pm_options_t. No behaviour change; CRuby could pass a smaller value on non-main threads, which would reject some code that parses today (Support a maximum depth to protect against malicious payloads #1774 shows real templates past depth 1000) but still beats a segfault. - Check actual stack use instead of a count, like CRuby's
stack_checkand CPython 3.14. Most robust, but needs a platform-specific way to find the stack bounds, with the counter as fallback.
Happy to open a PR for whichever you prefer. I have option 2 implemented (yuki-300#1, if it helps to see the shape of it); option 3 I would want to discuss the API for first.
C harness used for the `ulimit` row
#include <prism.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
FILE *f = fopen(argv[1], "rb");
fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); long n = ftell(f); fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
uint8_t *buf = malloc(n); fread(buf, 1, n, f); fclose(f);
pm_arena_t *arena = pm_arena_new();
pm_parser_t *parser = pm_parser_new(arena, buf, n, NULL);
pm_node_t *root = pm_parse(parser);
printf("parsed %p\n", (void *) root);
pm_parser_free(parser);
pm_arena_free(arena);
return 0;
}$ cc -Iinclude harness.c build/libprism.a -o harness
$ ruby -e 'File.write("n.rb", "x = " + "[" * 2000 + "]" * 2000)'
$ (ulimit -s 1024; ./harness n.rb); echo $?
139
Activity
kddnewton commentedon Oct 24, 2026
Thanks for the report! I can definitely see the problem.
I like option 3 the best but I don't think we need to make it check the actual platform-specific stack bound. I think if we accept a stack budget as an option that would get us at least part of the way there.
I think the real solution is to parse on a thread that has a larger stack size like clang does when it hits a certain limit.
I'll experiment with both of these and get back to you.