Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Email: biuro@softspark.eu

Response SLA: 48 hours.

Process:

1. Report via email with description and reproduction steps
2. We confirm receipt within 48 hours
3. We investigate and develop a fix
4. We coordinate disclosure and credit the reporter

The gh wrapper asks gh auth token --user for the account bound to the current workspace and passes it through GH_TOKEN only to that command. It does not switch the globally active account or save the token. Tokens already supplied by the caller take precedence. SSH keys remain referenced through SSH aliases. Audit JSON and SARIF omit remote URLs and email addresses.

The plugin makes no network requests of its own. wclone shells out to git ls-remote and git clone; the wrapped gh command makes the requests the caller selected. The local audit does not contact remotes. There is no telemetry.

The npm package ships ignore-scripts=true and is published with --ignore-scripts. Linking the plugin and editing ~/.zshrc happen only when you run npx @softspark/gitspace install, and the .zshrc edit is confirmed interactively unless you pass --yes. A backup is written first.

workspaces.conf is parsed with plain field splitting — never eval, and tilde expansion is done by string substitution rather than by the shell. A malicious entry cannot execute code through the parser.

The hooks are advisory in the sense that git commit --no-verify bypasses them, and a repository setting its own core.hooksPath (husky does this) overrides them. The url.<alias>.insteadOf layer is the one that holds regardless, because the remote enforces it. Treat the hooks as the fast feedback loop and the key separation as the actual boundary.

In scope:

• Code execution through workspaces.conf, ~/.ssh/config or URL parsing
• Identity guards that pass when they should refuse
• Leaking a token or key path into logs or command lines
• The installer writing outside $ZSH_CUSTOM/plugins or ~/.zshrc

Out of scope:

• --no-verify and other documented bypasses
• Security of git, gh, ssh, GitHub or GitLab themselves
• Social engineering