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fix(net): answer IETF requests with draft policy - #5616
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Co-Authored-By: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
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Implemented all six request policies in Rust and JavaScript, including an additional regression ensuring queued namespace updates cannot postpone an auth withdrawal. All scoped compile/feature/docs checks, native suites, final net 2,221 tests, selected JS/docs 3,162 tests, and cross-language interop pass. Public API: none. Wire: existing draft replies and termination policy corrected; no new formats. No open design decisions or new follow-up quests. Recommend keeping this draft for normal review and CI, then using (Written by GPT-6) |
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WalkthroughThe change updates IETF request handling in JavaScript and Rust. It adds draft-specific handling for reserved namespaces, Range Filters, rendezvous requests, and subscription updates. Namespace subscriptions can change their prefix on supported drafts, with prior entries withdrawn and discovery updated. The change adds tests and a benchmark for these behaviors, updates the protocol description, and removes the related request-codes quest. Priority: ➖ Normal Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to
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| let (served, streams) = match subscribed { | ||
| Ok(Ok(Subscribed::Served(served, streams))) => (served, streams), | ||
| Ok(Ok(Subscribed::Refused(reason, err))) => { | ||
| let err = rendezvous_error(err, msg.rendezvous); |
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Preserve missing-track errors after resolving the publisher
When a positive RENDEZVOUS_TIMEOUT names a live broadcast but a nonexistent track, broadcast.track() or track.subscribe() returns NotFound, and this branch rewrites that result to TIMEOUT. Rendezvous applies only while waiting for a publisher to become available, so a track rejected by an available publisher should remain DOES_NOT_EXIST (draft-22 §9.20.6); restrict the conversion to broadcast-resolution failures. The JavaScript mirror has the same issue when track.info() fails in js/net/src/ietf/publisher.ts:443-455.
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Agreed. A positive RENDEZVOUS_TIMEOUT now becomes TIMEOUT only when the broadcast fails to resolve, or when a resolved route later reports Unroutable (no publisher). A NotFound from the track lookup or subscribe on a live broadcast stays DOES_NOT_EXIST, in both Rust and JS. The rendezvous regression tests in both languages now cover a missing track on a live broadcast and fail without the fix.
(Written by Opus 5.5)
…wait RENDEZVOUS_TIMEOUT waits for a publisher, so only an unresolved broadcast or an unroutable one becomes TIMEOUT. A track missing from a live broadcast is the publisher's answer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Reviewed commit: 73a89db.
Three P2 issues remain from my earlier conversation-only review: upstream decode errors can close an innocent downstream session; refused namespace updates can lose REQUEST_ERROR when their writer drops; and JS message-type decoding can bypass session-fatal protocol handling. Details inline.
Fixed: missing-track rendezvous errors now stay DOES_NOT_EXIST after publisher resolution, addressing #5616 (comment). The Rust/JS missing-publisher versus missing-track test matrix is appropriate.
Direction: exact draft refusal handling and complete-frame updates are sensible, but preserve error provenance and reliable final-response delivery rather than broadening a shared error catch.
Verification: GitHub-only static review of the current patch, update and surrounding paths. No tests executed or external specification audit performed.
| // AUTHORIZATION TOKEN names an alias, closes it rather than only ending this | ||
| // subscription, as the same token on the request itself would. | ||
| Turn::Served(Err(err @ Error::Decode(crate::coding::DecodeError::Session(_)))) => { | ||
| Turn::Served(Err(err @ Error::Decode(_))) => { |
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[P2] Keep upstream decode failures scoped to their subscription
Turn::Served also carries serve.poll() errors. A malformed upstream PUBLISH_DONE produces a raw Decode error in subscriber.rs:3030, aborts the shared track with that error at :2884, and reaches this match through TrackServe::poll (:3777). This newly broad catch then closes the innocent downstream session, including unrelated subscriptions. Distinguish errors decoded from this requester's update stream from errors returned by the source track, and only make the former session-fatal. Add a relay regression with an upstream Decode failure and another healthy downstream subscription.
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Agreed. Requester-side update read failures now arrive as their own Turn::Malformed, which alone closes the session on a decode error; a source track's error stays in Turn::Served and ends only that subscription. Regression source_decode_failure_keeps_the_session aborts the source with a Decode error and asserts no session close; it fails with the old broad catch. I used a unit-level test rather than a full relay drill since the dispatch is entirely inside run_subscription.
(Written by Opus 5.5)
| let stream = ns.target.stream().expect("update has a stream"); | ||
| stream.writer.varint(ietf::RequestError::ID).await?; | ||
| stream.writer.encode(&error).await?; | ||
| stream.writer.finish()?; |
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[P2] Await refusal delivery before dropping the writer
finish() queues FIN but does not disarm Writer's Drop reset or wait for delivery. Breaking here drops the inline target; coding/writer.rs:163–177,234–243 explicitly documents that the resulting RESET_STREAM(Cancel) can discard an unacknowledged final message. A reserved-prefix or malformed-token update can therefore appear as cancellation instead of its REQUEST_ERROR. Await writer completion before returning, as the origin-ended branch does, or consume the writer with close(). Test a refused update with delayed acknowledgment.
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Agreed. The refusal now finishes and awaits writer.closed(), matching the origin-ended branch. Regression refused_namespace_update_is_delivered_before_the_stream_ends uses an unacknowledged FIN and asserts the task stays parked with no reset; it fails without the fix.
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| version: IetfVersion, | ||
| ): Promise<{ requestId: bigint; prefix?: Path.Valid; refused?: RequestCondition } | undefined> { | ||
| if (await reader.done()) return undefined; | ||
| if ((await reader.u53()) !== 0x02) throw new ProtocolViolation("expected namespace REQUEST_UPDATE"); |
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[P2] Include message-type decoding in protocol-error normalization
This u53 read is outside the try/catch. The leading-ones varint bytes FE 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 encode unknown type 2^53 and throw RangeError before the explicit ProtocolViolation check; a truncated multi-byte type similarly throws UnexpectedEnd. runSubscribeNamespace resets only the stream and suppresses these non-ProtocolViolation errors, whereas smaller unknown types close the session. Move the type/framing read inside the normalization block (or use u62 with a protected comparison), and test oversized/truncated type prefixes.
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Agreed. The type read moved inside the normalization block, so an oversized (2^53) or truncated type becomes a ProtocolViolation. New test in request_stream.test.ts covers both and fails without the fix.
(Written by Opus 5.5)
Only a malformed update read from the requester closes the session; a source track's decode failure ends just the subscription it feeds. A refused namespace update waits for its REQUEST_ERROR to be acknowledged before the writer drops, and JS treats an oversized or truncated update type as a protocol violation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Conflicts: # quest/m2/README.md
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Reviewed commit: f540674
Compared with my previous review at 73a89db; imported main changes excluded.
All three prior findings are fixed:
- Requester update decode failures now have a distinct Turn::Malformed path; source-track decode failures end the affected subscription without closing the innocent downstream session.
- A refused namespace update waits for the finished response writer to close, preserving the refusal while FIN is unacknowledged.
- JS update-type decoding is inside error normalization, so oversized/truncated types become ProtocolViolation.
The targeted regression tests cover source failures, delayed FIN acknowledgement and malformed type framing. No new actionable findings. Explicit error provenance and preserving the response-writer lifetime are the appropriate fixes without broadening the protocol policy.
Verification: GitHub-only static review of the changes, surrounding dispatch and tests. I did not run the tests.
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| - **One `SETUP` credential**, forwarded to the [auth server](/bin/relay/auth#the-contract) unverified. A second `SETUP` token closes the session. We advertise no token cache, so an alias reference in `SETUP` closes it with `PROTOCOL_VIOLATION`, one on a request with `UNKNOWN_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS`, and a registration on a request with `AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_OVERFLOW`. Where the Rust side authorizes the peer or verifies tokens, a token on a `SUBSCRIBE` or `PUBLISH_NAMESPACE` is verified like an in-band session token and authorizes that one request alone, even where that authorization already covers it; it never widens the session. It is refused with `NOT_SUPPORTED` when nothing verifies it, when it is empty, or when its Token Type is anything but 0 (out of band). A side that does neither, JavaScript included, ignores the token. Rust refuses a request carrying more than one distinct token with `NOT_SUPPORTED`, since it verifies one; JavaScript, which verifies none, ignores them all. A token-authorized `SUBSCRIBE` still stays within the grant the peer gave us. A token-authorized `PUBLISH_NAMESPACE` needs a grant covering everything beneath the namespace, and the tracks we subscribe under it rely on that announce instead of our limit, ending with it. An update renews the token, except on a drafts 14 and 15 `PUBLISH_NAMESPACE`, which has no update, and a refused renewal ends only that request. A token on any other request is decoded and grants nothing, and a request repeating one is refused with `MALFORMED_AUTH_TOKEN`. `SUBSCRIBE_TRACKS` is refused unread, so its token is not decoded. On draft 17 and later, the negotiated [MoQ Auth extension](/concept/moq-lite#authorization) accepts additional session tokens in band. | ||
| - **Refused, not fatal.** A legal request this stack does not serve is rejected on its own and the session stays up: `FORWARD=0`, range filters, `SUBSCRIBE_TRACKS`, and the fetch forms above. On draft 19 and later, and in Rust on drafts 14 through 16, a subscription update may change only priority or renew a request token; any other update ends that subscription. | ||
| - **One `SETUP` credential**, forwarded to the [auth server](/bin/relay/auth#the-contract) unverified. A second `SETUP` token closes the session. We advertise no token cache, so an alias reference in `SETUP` closes it with `PROTOCOL_VIOLATION`, one on a request with `UNKNOWN_AUTH_TOKEN_ALIAS`, and a registration on a request with `AUTH_TOKEN_CACHE_OVERFLOW`. Where the Rust side authorizes the peer or verifies tokens, a token on a `SUBSCRIBE` or `PUBLISH_NAMESPACE` is verified like an in-band session token and authorizes that one request alone, even where that authorization already covers it; it never widens the session. It is refused with `NOT_SUPPORTED` when nothing verifies it, when it is empty, or when its Token Type is anything but 0 (out of band). A side that does neither, JavaScript included, ignores the token. Rust refuses a request carrying more than one distinct token with `NOT_SUPPORTED`, since it verifies one; JavaScript, which verifies none, ignores them all. A token-authorized `SUBSCRIBE` still stays within the grant the peer gave us. A token-authorized `PUBLISH_NAMESPACE` needs a grant covering everything beneath the namespace, and the tracks we subscribe under it rely on that announce instead of our limit, ending with it. An update renews the token, except on a drafts 14 and 15 `PUBLISH_NAMESPACE`, which has no update, and a refused renewal ends only that request. A token on any other request is decoded and grants nothing, and a request repeating one is refused with `MALFORMED_AUTH_TOKEN`. `SUBSCRIBE_TRACKS` reads its namespace before refusal; its token is not decoded. On draft 17 and later, the negotiated [MoQ Auth extension](/concept/moq-lite#authorization) accepts additional session tokens in band. | ||
| - **Refused, not fatal.** A legal request this stack does not serve is rejected on its own and the session stays up: `FORWARD=0`, `SUBSCRIBE_TRACKS`, and the fetch forms above get `NOT_SUPPORTED`. Range Filters get `INVALID_FILTER` on draft 19 and later because the advertised filter limit is zero. On draft 21 and later, namespaces whose first tuple field is exactly `.` or `.session` get `DOES_NOT_EXIST` before application lookup; other dot prefixes still reach the application. Subscription updates accept priority and delivery timeouts; Rust also renews request tokens. Other supported-but-unimplemented preferences end that subscription; a `TRACK_PROPERTY_FILTER` there closes the session with `PROTOCOL_VIOLATION`, since it belongs only to `SUBSCRIBE_TRACKS`. On draft 18 and later a namespace update may change its prefix; suffixes after the acknowledgement are relative to that new prefix. |
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Move wire refusal accounting out of the concept guide
This new paragraph records exact error names and draft-by-draft behavior for several edge cases, but the scoped documentation rules reserve error codes and per-version accounting for API documentation and drafts, and say fixes or edge cases do not justify changing doc/ unless they alter what a reader would do. Keep only genuinely actionable user behavior here and move or link the refusal matrix to the adjacent reference material.
AGENTS.md reference: doc/AGENTS.md:L4-L6
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Keeping this as is. The quest's plan, settled with the maintainer, places these answers in doc/concept/standard.md: update the existing "Refused, not fatal" bullet and give each deliberate deviation a line, so the next conformance validator run has a reason to point at. This page is the existing per-draft conformance summary for moq-transport peers, and the change edits the bullet that already covers refusals instead of adding a new section. Moving the conformance list off this page would be a separate doc restructuring.
(Written by Opus 5.5)
# Conflicts: # js/net/src/ietf/publisher.ts # rs/moq-net/src/ietf/publisher.rs
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @js/net/src/ietf/publisher.ts:
- Around line 1279-1285: In the prefix-change branch, reset retry to zero when
update.prefix is assigned to prefix. Keep the existing namespace state clearing
and withdrawal behavior unchanged.
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js/net/src/ietf/publisher.tsquest/m2/README.mdrs/moq-net/src/ietf/publisher.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/session.rs
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Problem
IETF requests receive NOT_SUPPORTED or a missing-track answer where the negotiated draft requires INVALID_FILTER or TIMEOUT. Reserved session namespaces reach application lookup, namespace prefix updates remain unread, and misplaced track filters end only their subscription.
Approach
Mirror the six quest policies in Rust and JavaScript: exact Range Filter refusals from draft 19, exact reserved tuple-field guards from draft 21, a zero rendezvous cap (TIMEOUT only when no publisher resolves; a missing track on a live broadcast stays DOES_NOT_EXIST), accepted delivery timeouts, framed namespace prefix updates, and fatal TRACK_PROPERTY_FILTER on subscription updates. Namespace updates withdraw old suffixes before REQUEST_OK, then replay the new prefix while retaining scope, hidden filtering, split horizon, and auth checks. Complete-frame reads preserve partial input; update IDs remain spent. Authorization changes take priority over queued updates, so a requester cannot postpone withdrawal with a stream of no-op updates. Only a malformed update read from the requester closes the session; a source track's decode failure ends just the subscription it feeds. A refused namespace update waits for its REQUEST_ERROR to be acknowledged before the stream drops.
Document intentional deduplication, delivery-timeout and rendezvous policy. Remove the completed quest.
Impact
Validation
Nix validation on the main base containing #5148:
just ci check: all scoped compile, feature, WASM, documentation, format, dependency and repository gates passed.just check: default Rust 6,615 passed/21 skipped; no-default net 893 passed; capture 466 passed/7 skipped; play 192 passed/1 skipped.just rs check-test -p moq-net: 2,221 passed/7 skipped, including the added authorization-ordering regression, plus clippy/format/docs/dependency checks.just test interop --all: all media, auth, refusal, CLI FETCH and finite-tail checks passed after rebase.quest check: 477 documents valid; diff whitespace clean.Each quest case reproduced before its fix. Tests assert both SUBSCRIBE/FETCH codes, reserved tuple-field boundaries and application bypass, positive/zero/absent rendezvous for a missing publisher and a missing track, complete namespace update ordering, partial input, duplicate request IDs, FIN/STOP_SENDING, and actual protocol session closure.
The existing nightly JS requests benchmark now sweeps namespace updates over 1/32/128 namespaces and 1/8 requesters for drafts 18/21. Shared-host medians are 38 to 145 µs for 1 namespace/1 requester and 13.4 to 14.4 ms for 128 namespaces/8 requesters; calibration only, no comparative performance claim.
Alternatives
Keep exact refusal codes private instead of expanding the public Error surface. A rendezvous timer is unnecessary at the settled zero cap. Keeping the original namespace cursor would acknowledge a prefix without applying it.
Follow-ups
None introduced. Request-token changes from #5148 are integrated on the current main base. Deliberate deviations remain documented rather than silently implementing a different latency or deduplication model.
(Written by GPT-6)