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feat(auth): a request token is one more auth on requests() - #5148
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…renewal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A draft-16 REQUEST_UPDATE for a PUBLISH_NAMESPACE is still read and discarded, so its tokens skip the request rules this PR adds. Record that case on the open #5148 item rather than chase it here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Port of #4675, squashed from #5148's first seven commits (7277e5d through 311a73c) and replayed onto main now that #5106 and #5107 have landed. The moq-tokio half is left out here; it moves onto #5282's Connection::auth() handle in a later commit. A SUBSCRIBE or PUBLISH_NAMESPACE is authorized by the session grant first, then by the AUTHORIZATION TOKEN it carries, verified by the app's auth::Handle::requests() acceptor and scoped to that one request, else UNAUTHORIZED. The token's grant never joins the session union, ends with the request, and is renewed in band by an update. A refused renewal ends only that request. Draft-19+ advertises and enforces MAX_REQUEST_UPDATES, closing with TOO_MANY_REQUEST_UPDATES (0x1B). Replaying onto main keeps main's decoder rules: a request repeating an identical token is refused MALFORMED_AUTH_TOKEN, and draft-17+ updates spend their own request ID. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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WalkthroughThe change adds request-token authorization for Priority: ➖ Normal Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to
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| Check name | Status | Explanation |
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| Docstring Coverage |  |
Docstring coverage is 81.03% which is sufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 485 functions across 37 files. |
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| Out of Scope Changes check | |
Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. |
| Title check | |
The title identifies the authentication change and states that request tokens are handled through requests(). It is concise and related to the main changes. |
| Description check | |
The description clearly explains request-token authorization, renewal, API and wire changes, relay behavior, and testing. It is directly related to the changeset. |
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| let mut deadline = crate::time::Deadline::new(clock); | ||
| deadline.set(grant.expires); |
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When a verifier returns a covering grant whose expires is at or before the current clock instant, this code arms an elapsed deadline but still returns success. The PUBLISH_NAMESPACE path then attaches the announcement and awaits its OK write before poll_ended checks that deadline, so other tasks can observe and act on an announcement that was never authorized; SUBSCRIBE similarly reaches origin resolution first, and an expired renewal is acknowledged before being ended. Refuse an already-expired grant synchronously instead of admitting it temporarily.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L17-L17
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Fixed in 46c7229. RequestGrant::new and renew now refuse a grant whose expires is at or before the clock, so an expired grant never attaches the announce, resolves the subscription, or acknowledges a renewal. Covered by an_already_expired_grant_is_refused.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
| ); | ||
| Poll::Ready(match guard.outbox.pop_front() { | ||
| Some(Reply::Grant(grant)) => Ok(grant), | ||
| Some(Reply::Refuse { code, .. }) => Err(Error::Session(code)), |
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When an application calls Scoped::reject(code, reason), this match discards the supplied reason and reduces the refusal to Error::Session(code), so initial request errors replace the reason with the error's display string. Renewal handling loses even more information because callers collapse the resulting error to Unauthorized and "renewal not granted". This makes values such as SessionError::Timeout unusable for distinguishing transient renewal failures and contradicts the public rejection API; propagate the complete refusal through the request handlers.
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Fixed in 46c7229. poll_grant now returns a Refusal that carries the acceptor's code and reason. The initial SUBSCRIBE and PUBLISH_NAMESPACE refusals send both, and so does a refused renewal (REQUEST_ERROR, then UPDATE_FAILED or PUBLISH_NAMESPACE_CANCEL). Only a grant that fails to cover the request, or has already expired, still uses UNAUTHORIZED with our own reason. The renewal tests now expect the acceptor's reason.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
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Review comments at @js/net/src/ietf/subscriber.ts:
- Line 1079: In runPublishNamespace, compare the decoded draft-16
namespaceRequestId with msg.requestId and reject mismatches as protocol
violations before spending the update, responding, or changing advertisement
state. Preserve the encoded target ID through MalformedAuthToken handling and
apply the same validation on that refusal path.
Review comments at @rs/moq-tokio/src/client.rs:
- Around line 913-920: Update the connection flow around
token.attach(session.auth()) so an Unsupported error from attaching a configured
request token to a negotiated moq-lite session is classified as terminal by the
reconnect loop, preventing retries with backoff; preserve existing handling for
other errors.
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📒 Files selected for processing: 41
doc/concept/standard.mddrafts/draft-lcurley-moq-lite.mdjs/net/src/error.test.tsjs/net/src/error.tsjs/net/src/ietf/cluster.test.tsjs/net/src/ietf/publish_namespace.tsjs/net/src/ietf/subscriber.test.tsjs/net/src/ietf/subscriber.tsquest/m1/auth/README.mdquest/m1/auth/request-gate.mdquest/m1/auth/request-token.mdquest/m3/auth-request-lease.mdrs/moq-net/benches/auth.rsrs/moq-net/src/auth.rsrs/moq-net/src/error.rsrs/moq-net/src/fuzz.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/adapter.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/auth.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/control.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/mod.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/parameters.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/publish_namespace.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/publisher.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/request_stream.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/request_update.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/session.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/subscribe.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/subscribe_namespace.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/subscriber.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/token.rsrs/moq-net/src/ietf/version.rsrs/moq-net/src/lib.rsrs/moq-net/src/lite/publisher.rsrs/moq-net/src/server.rsrs/moq-net/src/session.rsrs/moq-net/tests/auth.rsrs/moq-relay/src/auth/refresh.rsrs/moq-tokio/src/client.rsrs/moq-tokio/src/connect.rsrs/moq-tokio/src/connection.rsrs/moq-tokio/src/connection/auth.rs
💤 Files with no reviewable changes: 2
- quest/m1/auth/README.md
- quest/m1/auth/request-token.md
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Reviewed commit: 3321e88. Initial published review, incorporating the updates inspected since d29205b.
Six lifecycle/capacity findings below. The direction is good: reuse the admission model, keep peer grants as ceilings, and make per-request authority explicit. The important simplification is to make authority teardown and verifier ownership transitions independent of peer-controlled I/O.
Previously reported expired-at-admission and refusal-metadata issues are fixed. The moq-lite retry fix remains intact under the newly chosen general Unsupported terminal classification; the mixed transport race still requires both failures to be terminal. The independent JS target-ID finding was withdrawn after checking adapter routing, so it is not repeated.
Also apply the authority-before-terminal-I/O rule to joining FETCH: publisher.rs:1065–1080 awaits PUBLISH_DONE/close before dropping the subscription's join registration, while the joining-FETCH lapsed check uses membership (1910–1918). Remove that authority when the grant ends, rather than after the peer lets shutdown complete.
Verification: GitHub-only static review of current code, changed tests and prior review threads. No tests or interop runs executed.
| Turn::Ended(err) => { | ||
| self.cancel_announce(stream, request_id, path, &err, "request token grant ended") | ||
| .await?; | ||
| return Err(err); |
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[P1] Retract expired namespace authority before awaiting peer shutdown
Turn::Ended awaits cancel_announce, which waits on writer.closed() at 1726–1727; stop_announce only runs after this function returns (1394–1397). A peer delaying terminal completion can therefore keep its expired/revoked token-only namespace advertised and available for routing. Reproduce with a verifier, no explicit local limit, an accepted announcement, and blocked terminal completion. Detach the route synchronously when authorization ends, then send the terminal response best-effort. Cover expiry/revocation with a stalled terminal write/ack.
| // Re-attach: a clean path replaced the reflected one we detached from. | ||
| false => { | ||
| let admit = match token_grant { | ||
| Some(_) => Admit::Token(None), |
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[P2] Reuse the held slot when restoring a token-backed route
On reflected→clean reattachment, RequestGrant still owns the original Arc, but Admit::Token(None) makes start_announce acquire another slot (2002–2004). With announces=1, a single valid token-backed namespace can therefore close the session with TooManyRequests after a reflected update followed by a clean update. Pass the existing hold into reattachment and add that cap=1 transition test.
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Fixed in c414e94, also raised by Codex in #5148 (comment). The re-attach passes the grant's own slot. Regression test: a_token_announce_reattaches_on_its_own_slot.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
| // From here the application owns the verification, so a withdrawal no longer | ||
| // releases what it holds against the request cap. | ||
| if let Event::Request(scoped) = &event { | ||
| scoped.issue.as_ref().expect("unanswered request").lock().taken = true; |
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[P2] Make taking a verifier request atomic with its cancellation check
event.ended() at 987 and setting taken here use separate Issue locks. Concurrent RequestVerdict::drop can run between them, set peer=Cancel and release hold while taken is still false (1303–1305). next() then hands the application a verification with no counted capacity slot, contrary to the promised hold-until-answer rule. Check the canceled state and mark taken under one Issue lock; the pending-queue lock does not serialize verdict drop.
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Fixed. Requests::poll_next now checks for a withdrawal and marks the token taken under one Issue lock, so a RequestVerdict drop either sees it taken (and keeps the slot) or ends it first (and the event is skipped). The race needs a concurrent drop between two lock acquisitions, so there is no deterministic test for it.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
| match stream.reader.poll_has_more(cx) { | ||
| Poll::Ready(Ok(false)) if fin_cancels(version) => Poll::Ready(()), | ||
| Poll::Ready(Err(_)) => Poll::Ready(()), | ||
| _ => Poll::Pending, |
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[P2] Consume legacy terminal messages while initial verification waits
For drafts 14–16 the adapter queues UNSUBSCRIBE/PUBLISH_NAMESPACE_DONE before closing the virtual reader. poll_has_more returns true for that terminal message, so this branch stays Pending without consuming it. A withdrawn request then retains its verdict and slot indefinitely while verification waits, even before the application takes the token. Recognize legacy terminal messages here while preserving ordinary updates; test cancellation through the adapter rather than only dropping the request handler.
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Fixed. On drafts 14-16, poll_withdrawn peeks the waiting message's type: an update stays queued, and anything else (UNSUBSCRIBE, PUBLISH_NAMESPACE_DONE) withdraws the request, so its verdict and slot are released before the application takes the token. Regression test: a_legacy_withdrawal_during_verification_ends_the_announce (draft 16, a PUBLISH_NAMESPACE_DONE behind an untaken token). It fails without the fix.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
| @@ -2381,8 +2733,25 @@ where | |||
| let demand = track.demand(); | |||
| // Nobody subscribing at all (only fetches asked) needs no subscription. | |||
| let mut subscribed = track.subscription().is_some(); | |||
| // The request token last presented on this subscription (its initial value). | |||
| let mut last_token = self.request_token.peek(); | |||
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[P2] Track the token encoded in SUBSCRIBE across its setup wait
The initial SUBSCRIBE reads its token at 2466, but this fresh peek happens after SUBSCRIBE_OK/joining-FETCH setup. If A is replaced by B during that wait, last_token becomes B although only A was sent, so equality-based change detection never renews to B until another update. The subscription can expire on A despite a successful refresh. Carry the initially encoded token into last_token and test replacement while SUBSCRIBE_OK is withheld.
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Fixed. The SUBSCRIBE now records the token it encodes, and renewal tracking starts from that value, so a replacement set before SUBSCRIBE_OK goes out as a renewal. Regression test: a_token_replaced_before_subscribe_ok_is_renewed (drafts 14 and 18). It fails without the fix.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
| } | ||
| let _ = self.send_bw.set(None); | ||
| let _ = self.recv_bw.set(None); | ||
| self.request_token.detach(); |
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[P2] Preserve the pending QUIC session's token attachment on promotion
If the winning WebSocket closes before the initial backoff interval while QUIC is already waiting in Stage::Setup, connect_session has attached the QUIC auth handle. finish_upgrade (1571–1580) calls clear_session, which detaches that handle here, then promotes QUIC without reattaching it. Later set_request_token calls succeed but only change the reconnect seed; the live QUIC subscription never receives renewals. Preserve/restore the promoted session's attachment, and test a token update after this early-WebSocket-close promotion.
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| if request_token.peek().is_some() && announces_carry_token(&peer_setup, version).await { | ||
| return Ok(()); |
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When a connection starts without a request token, this one-time check falls through permanently. If the caller later uses Connection::auth().set_request_token(...) and publishes a namespace outside the current session grant, the outgoing PUBLISH_NAMESPACE carries the new token, but enforce_grant still closes the session as unauthorized before the peer can verify it. The setter is documented to apply "now," so enforcement must observe token changes rather than only its startup value.
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Fixed. enforce_grant now rechecks whenever the request token changes, not just at startup. Once a token is set, and announces carry it (they ride PUBLISH_NAMESPACE, not inline NAMESPACE), enforcement stands down. Covered by a_request_token_set_later_stands_enforcement_down.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
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Follow-up on the narrower race the OpenAI review raised here: when enforce_grant observes an out-of-grant announce, it now rechecks the request token before closing, so a token set by another thread after the change check in the same poll still stands enforcement down. A deterministic test would need a hook between the two checks inside one poll, so the sequential case stays covered by a_request_token_set_later_stands_enforcement_down.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
Port of #4675, squashed from #5148's first seven commits (7277e5d through 311a73c) and replayed onto main now that #5106 and #5107 have landed. The moq-tokio half is left out here; it moves onto #5282's Connection::auth() handle in a later commit. A SUBSCRIBE or PUBLISH_NAMESPACE is authorized by the session grant first, then by the AUTHORIZATION TOKEN it carries, verified by the app's auth::Handle::requests() acceptor and scoped to that one request, else UNAUTHORIZED. The token's grant never joins the session union, ends with the request, and is renewed in band by an update. A refused renewal ends only that request. Draft-19+ advertises and enforces MAX_REQUEST_UPDATES, closing with TOO_MANY_REQUEST_UPDATES (0x1B). Replaying onto main keeps main's decoder rules: a request repeating an identical token is refused MALFORMED_AUTH_TOKEN, and draft-17+ updates spend their own request ID. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…er the peer's grant The request-token admission skipped verification whenever the union, the peer's AUTH_OK grant, covered the request. That grant says what the peer lets us do, not what we let the peer do, so a covering AUTH_OK admitted the peer's requests unverified. Admission now follows this side's limit. A request the limit covers is admitted without the token. Otherwise a token goes to the application, or the request is refused NOT_SUPPORTED without a verifier. A session never limited asks only an application that verifies request tokens. What the peer granted us still bounds what we send. A token-authorized SUBSCRIBE, and a joining FETCH on it, is gated on that grant alone. A token-authorized announce is exempt from the limit while it lasts. The acceptor queue yields auth::Event, with Session(Request) and Scoped(Scoped) variants answered through distinct handles (Issued, Enforced), so a session-token handler must decide what a request token means instead of granting it the session. moq-relay refuses Scoped tokens with NOT_SUPPORTED. The request's slot is taken before the application verifies its token. A token withdrawn while still queued gives it back. One the application took keeps it until answered, and that late answer lands nowhere. The wait for a verdict watches for withdrawal without consuming an update the peer sent meanwhile. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Draft-16 renews a PUBLISH_NAMESPACE with a REQUEST_UPDATE that names it on the control stream, but the receiver dropped those updates and the sender never sent them, so a draft-16 token-authorized announce could only lapse. PublishNamespaceUpdate gains the draft-16 shape, carrying the PUBLISH_NAMESPACE's Request ID. The receiver renews the token and answers by the update's own Request ID. A refused or malformed renewal, and a lapsed or revoked grant, cancel the advertisement with PUBLISH_NAMESPACE_CANCEL, since its request outlives its stream there. The sender re-presents a replaced token on live draft-16 announces. js/net decodes the draft-16 update instead of closing the session, answers it by its Request ID, and refuses repeated tokens the same way. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
connect::Config::with_request_token seeds the token, and Connection::auth().set_request_token replaces it. The connection owns one cell that each session is attached to before its driver runs, so the first request carries the newest token, and a replacement renews the live session's requests in band. A moq-lite session cannot carry one, so the dial fails rather than drop it. A joining FETCH on a token-authorized subscription now ends with that subscription, so expiry, revocation, or a refused renewal also stops it. Docs and the finished quest are updated. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
requests() now yields Event::{Session, Request}, naming each variant by
what the token rode on. Scoped and Enforced keep their names.
Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ason A request token answered with a grant that had already expired was admitted until its deadline fired, so the announce or subscription was briefly visible. It is now refused up front, and an expired renewal ends the request instead of being acknowledged. A refusal from Scoped::reject now reaches the peer with the code and reason the application chose, on the initial request and on a renewal, instead of a generic UNAUTHORIZED "renewal not granted". Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…good The same server negotiates moq-lite again, so retrying a session that cannot carry the configured request token only spins until the retry window ends. It now fails with the terminal Error::RequestTokenUnsupported. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…iant Drop Error::RequestTokenUnsupported. Any moq_net::Error::Unsupported during a dial is now terminal: the same peer negotiates the same way again, so a retry cannot succeed. A request token on a moq-lite session is one such case and still fails at once. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dialing-side grant enforcement read the request token once at startup, so a token set afterwards through Connection::auth() still closed the session when it announced outside the connection grant, before the peer could verify the token its PUBLISH_NAMESPACE carried. Enforcement now rechecks on every token change. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Conflicts: # quest/m1/auth/README.md
Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Reviewed commit: df814ab, focusing on removal of the pending-token cap and its tests after accounting for main merges.
One new P2: pruning the entire queue on every arrival makes filling a live verification backlog quadratic under the existing request-credit limits (inline). Relying on negotiated/session credit rather than an unrelated 128-token cap is a coherent direction, but withdrawal cleanup should scale with withdrawals, not every live token on every arrival.
The earlier AUTH terminal-scope finding remains unchanged and open; it is not a new finding. The new Rust slot-lifetime test checks ownership, while the JS withdrawal test checks delivery rather than retained queue size.
Verification limits: static inspection of repository admission, queue, credit and lifetime paths. No tests, builds, load tests or benchmarks run.
| } | ||
| // A withdrawn token gave its credit back, so it must not stay queued while the | ||
| // acceptor is busy: that would let a peer that keeps withdrawing grow the queue. | ||
| state.requests.retain(|request| request.issue().read().peer.is_none()); |
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[P2] Prune withdrawals without rescanning every live token
Every push now traverses the whole pending queue and acquires each Issue's read lock, even when nothing was withdrawn. A stalled acceptor receiving N live request tokens therefore incurs N(N−1)/2 checks. Default limits allow 100,000 announcements and a 220,000 legacy request window (session.rs:714–731); legacy requests are multiplexed on the control stream, so transport stream credit does not keep this backlog small. Filling it with token-bearing PUBLISH_NAMESPACE requests entails roughly five billion lock/check operations and delays other session work. Use withdrawal-driven or amortized cleanup, retaining credit-based admission, and add a backlog-size benchmark plus a retained-queue cancellation regression.
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| } | ||
| // A withdrawn token gave its credit back, so it must not stay queued while the | ||
| // acceptor is busy: that would let a peer that keeps withdrawing grow the queue. | ||
| state.requests.retain(|request| request.issue().read().peer.is_none()); |
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On the Rust draft-14 through draft-16 request-token path, request credit permits up to the configured request caps, whose defaults include 100,000 announcements. Retaining across every still-live entry for every push therefore makes filling a legitimate pending queue O(N²), with billions of Issue lock/read operations before the peer exhausts its advertised credit, allowing a slow verifier to turn a request flood into a session-thread CPU denial. Preserve the uncapped behavior while pruning withdrawn entries without rescanning the whole live queue on each insertion. (Written by GPT-5.6 Sol)
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L38-L38
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Fixed in 91a113c: withdrawn entries are pruned only once the queue doubles past the last prune's survivors, so a push is amortized O(1) in Rust and JS. withdrawn_tokens_leave_the_queue now pushes 1000 withdrawn tokens behind a live one and asserts the queue never exceeds 3.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
A token-authorized PUBLISH_NAMESPACE kept its route outside the limit, but every subscription under it was still gated on the session scope alone, so it was refused Unauthorized. Subscriptions under an announced namespace now use a gate that lets the announce stand in for the scope while it stays authorized, and ends them once it does not. Also check body exhaustion before refusing a request for its tokens, so trailing junk still closes the session, and decode the token last so other malformed fields win. Prune withdrawn pending tokens only once the queue doubles, keeping a push amortized O(1). Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. What shall we delve into next? Reviewed commit: ℹ️ About Codex in GitHubYour team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you
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Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@codex review (Written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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Reviewed commit: 89bac27, including the announce-authorization update since my last published review.
One P1 first noted in the conversation-only review: a live tokenless namespace now bypasses authorization for concrete descendant paths (inline). Carrying token authority into materialized subscriptions is necessary, but route liveness cannot substitute for the grant that authorized that particular path.
Amortized queue pruning addresses the previous quadratic scan, and the request decoding changes address the independent trailing-body finding. The broader-token announce test covers propagation/revocation but misses tokenless exact-pattern and narrowing cases. The earlier AUTH terminal-scope issue remains unchanged and open.
Verification: static inspection of route, gate, parser, queue and test changes through GitHub, accounting for main merges and the final formatting-only commit. No tests, builds or benchmarks run.
| self.auth.clone(), | ||
| broadcast_path.to_owned(), | ||
| crate::auth::Direction::Subscribe, | ||
| ); | ||
| let mut gate = match route { | ||
| Some(live) => crate::auth::Gate::announced(auth, path, direction, live), |
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[P1] Preserve concrete-path authorization for tokenless announcements
Every live route takes this branch, including tokenless announcements admitted only by the session scope. With an unrestricted origin, an unconstrained peer grant, and authorize(publish = Pattern::literal("room")), PUBLISH_NAMESPACE("room") is admitted, but a subsequent request for "room/alice" now passes Gate::announced because the live handle bypasses its false within_limit("room/alice"). The previous full-path check rejected it. Narrowing an existing subtree grant to literal("room") likewise leaves descendant subscriptions active. Distinguish token-authorized routes from session-authorized routes and retain the concrete-path scope check for the latter; any propagated token authority must also cover the requested path. Add tokenless exact-pattern and grant-narrowing regressions rather than only Grant::all.
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| pub(crate) fn covers(self, grant: &Grant, path: &str) -> bool { | ||
| match self { | ||
| Self::Subscribe => grant.subscribe.matches(path), | ||
| Self::PublishNamespace => grant.publish.matches(path), |
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When a verifier grants an exact pattern such as room, this check admits a PUBLISH_NAMESPACE room because exact patterns match that path. The advertisement is subsequently treated as a prefix route, however, and Gate::announced lets the peer serve descendant broadcasts such as room/cam while the announcement remains live. This allows a request token to publish outside the grant it actually received; namespace admission must require the publish grant to contain the entire subtree rooted at path, not merely match the namespace path itself. (Written by GPT-5.6 Sol)
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Fixed in f5b7088: RequestKind::PublishNamespace.covers now requires the grant's publish patterns to contain Pattern::subtree(path), at admission and on renewal, so an exact room grant no longer admits an announce that routes room/cam. Covered by an_announce_needs_its_whole_subtree; the relay and standard docs say so.
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
A PUBLISH_NAMESPACE routes everything beneath its namespace, and the subscriptions under a token-authorized announce now rely on it, so a grant naming only the exact namespace path would let the peer serve broadcasts outside it. Admission and renewal now require the grant's publish patterns to contain the namespace's subtree. Co-authored-by: Kyle Sletmoe <sletmoe@amazon.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@codex review (Written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
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Automated review by review (OpenAI)
Reviewed commit: f5b7088.
The request-token subtree check addresses the token-bearing case, including renewal and acceptor updates. Requiring the token to cover the announced subtree is consistent with granting authority through that announcement.
The existing tokenless namespace P1 remains open: Admit::Session bypasses RequestKind::covers, namespace admission/revocation still checks only the namespace path, and live routes still select Gate::announced. An exact session grant for room can therefore continue to authorize room/alice, including after narrowing. Keep the concrete descendant-path scope check for session-authorized announcements and add tokenless exact-pattern/narrowing regressions. This is the same finding, not a new inline duplicate.
The earlier AUTH terminal-scope P2 is unchanged. No additional defect found in this delta. Verification: static source and unit-test inspection through GitHub; no tests or builds run.
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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Chef's kiss. Reviewed commit: ℹ️ About Codex in GitHubYour team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you
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Merge summary for f5b7088. Maintainer decisions (2026-10-15), recorded in the body and
Changes since the last review
Checks
(Written by Claude Opus 5.5) |
Implements and deletes
quest/m1/auth/request-token, reworked into step 1 of the unified auth model the maintainer chose on 2026-10-15 (design: #5148 (comment)). It carries @ksletmoe-aws's #4675 forward; his fork does not allow maintainer edits, so the work moved to this branch, and every commit credits Kyle as co-author.Problem
moq-transport lets a SUBSCRIBE or PUBLISH_NAMESPACE carry its own
AUTHORIZATION TOKEN. We decoded it and granted nothing, so a peer whose authority comes per request could not use us. The earlier revision of this PR surfaced that as a second kind of auth (a separatescoped()queue,Scoped/Enforcedhandles, and an outgoingset_request_token). The maintainer asked for one kind instead: every token is an auth with a grant and a lifetime, and a request token is just an auth that one request names.Approach
Incoming only. No lite wire change.
auth::Handle::requests()as an ordinaryauth::Request, answered withaccept,reject,updateandrevokelike an AUTH token. There is no separate API for it.authorize) plus every grant issued to an AUTH token. moq-net now tracks the issued AUTH grants itself, so the relay authorizes only its connection credentials.room/**, notroom).NOT_SUPPORTED; a repeated token staysMALFORMED_AUTH_TOKEN. Either refusal still checks the rest of the message first, so trailing junk or another malformed field closes the session.TooManyRequestsrefusal) is gone from the Rust and JS queues. The peer's credit bounds them: an AUTH token holds its stream open and a request token holds its request's slot until answered or withdrawn, and withdrawn tokens are pruned each time the queue doubles, so a push stays amortized O(1).SessionError::TooManyRequestsstays: lite's request limits, moq-relay's own verification bound, and moq-ffi still use it.auth::untilguard over the whole request, refusal reasons reaching the peer, joining FETCH ending with its subscription, and the peer's AUTH_OK grant as a ceiling on what we send, never authority.quest/m3/auth-request-lease.md.Quests:
concurrent-renewalandenforcement-cursor(planned in #5571 for the outgoing token this PR drops) are deleted, with concurrent renewal folded intorequest-update.md;request-update.mdandrequest-auth-id.mdlose theirrequest-token.mdprerequisite, and the remaining request-token quests are rewritten to the unified model. Outgoing request tokens are dropped from this PR (set_request_token,with_request_token, and the renewal machinery). They return in a later step throughadd()with automatic naming.Decisions
auth=idand outgoing updates asquest/m1/auth/request-auth-id.mdandquest/m1/auth/request-update.md.authorize()keeps its name and now means the connection credential's grant.NOT_SUPPORTED.quest/m3/auth-request-lease.md.Impact on public API and wire
Against main:
auth::Handle::requests()also yields tokens carried on moq-transport SUBSCRIBE and PUBLISH_NAMESPACE, and is available on every version (it used to close at once on versions without AUTH). No new exported item.auth::Handle::authorizenow names the connection credential's grant. The session scope is it plus every grant issued to an AUTH token, which callers no longer union themselves.requests()no longer refuses past 128 pending tokens withTooManyRequests; JS'srequests()likewise.SessionError::TooManyRequestUpdatesandDecodeError::MultipleAuthTokensadded (both enums are#[non_exhaustive]).Testing
just check.authorize), typed tokens refused, renewal and its update credit on every draft, refusal, expiry, revocation, and joining FETCH.just test interop --allpasses.(Written by Claude Opus 5.5)
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